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Introduction
Should judges construe statutes narrowly to avoid deciding whether Congress has
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to another body? The Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns1 sheds light on this issue. The Court rejected the District of
Columbia Circuit’s practice of ordering administrative agencies to narrowly construe statutes to avoid
possible violations of the nondelegation doctrine.2 Since the Court did not examine the question of
whether its rationale for rejecting administrative saving constructions should likewise apply to courts,
this question remains open, and of great interest to scholars, judges, and litigants.3 Indeed, this question
raises issues central to the operation of federal courts, administrative law, and to constitutional law.
Judicial reliance upon the nondelegation doctrine as a source of constitutional authority to revise
regulatory statutes could aggrandize the judiciary at the expense of the more democratic branches of
government, and could significantly affect public law.
This article has two major aims. Descriptively, this article disputes the conventional view that
numerous canons of construction, including the canon that courts should construe statutes to avoid
1

531 U.S. 457 (2001).

Id. at 472-73. Cf. American Trucking Ass’ns. v. Browner, 175 F. 3rd 1027, 1038 (D.C.
Cir. 1999), modified on petition for rehearing en banc, 195 F.3rd 4, reversed in part sub. nom.
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); International Union, UAW v. OSHA,
938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
2

See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 452, 476 (2002) (reading American Trucking as suggesting that courts,
rather than agencies, should interpret statutes to avoid nondelegation claims); Cass Sunstein,
Regulating Risks After ATA, ___ SUP. CT . REV ___, ____ (2002) (identifying judicial saving
construction as an available response to serious nondelegation concerns after American Trucking).
Cf. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-73.
3

1

constitutional issues if fairly possible (the avoidance canon), currently implement nondelegation values.4
It shows that the nondelegation doctrine has played little or no role in statutory construction.
Normatively, this article argues that the nondelegation doctrine should play little or no role in statutory
construction. It examines Justice Scalia’s reasons for rejecting administrative construction as a cure for
non-delegation ills in American Trucking and explains how this reasoning applies to judicial
construction as well.5 Construction by another branch of government just does not solve the problem
created by arguably improper delegation. 6 This article also refines this argument extending Scalia’s
analysis, by pointing out its limits, and adds to it, by exploring the consequences of not avoiding the
constitutional issue. This exploration of consequences emphasizes a point neglected in the literature: a
constitutional ruling on nondelegation does not formally limit the policy choices available to Congress.
Because of this, the avoidance canon has less value in the nondelegation context than in other contexts.
While the nondelegation doctrine has played less of a role in statutory construction than many

Cf. Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (arguing that
numerous substantive canons of statutory construction implement nondelegation doctrines); Lisa S.
Bressman, Essay: Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Administrative State, 109 YALE L. J. 1399, 1409-11 (2000) (describing the application of clear
statement rules and the avoidance canon as “surrogates for the nondelegation doctrine”); Ernest
Gelhorn, The Proper Role of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 31 ENVT ’L L. REP . (ENVT ’L L. INST.)
10232, 10232 (2001) (claiming that the lower court opinion in American Trucking was “remarkable
only for its ordinariness in applying the nondelegation doctrine in a limited sphere,” that of statutory
interpretation).
4

5

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 473.

Cf. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP.
CT . REV. 223, 228 (2000) (“if the point of the nondelegation doctrine is to ensure that Congress makes
important statutory policy, a strategy that requires the judiciary . . . to rewrite . . .
a . ..statute cannot . . .serve” the doctrine’s goal.)
6

2

scholars suggest, the nondelegation doctrine has played a role in a few significant recent decisions.
Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in the “Benzene Case”7 (evaluating the legality of an
Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard for benzene) called for a revival of the
nondelegation doctrine,8 which the Court had used to strike down significant New Deal legislation at the
end of the Lochner-era.9 A small group of scholars, following Rehnquist’s lead, called for a revival of
the nondelegation doctrine.10

7

Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980).

8

Id. at 672-688.

See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down New Deal legislation
establishing restrictions on “hot oil” under the nondelegation doctrine); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down New Deal industrial codes under the
nondelegation doctrine) . See also American Textile Manufacturers Union, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist J., dissenting) (reiterating his support for a revival of the nondelegation
doctrine, this time with Justice Burger joining his opinion). See generally Sandra B. Zellmer, The
Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New
Deal, 32 ARIZ . STATE L. J. 941, 942-43 (2000) (suggesting that the nondelegation doctrine expressed
Lochner-era hostility to “socially progressive legislation”).
9

See e.g. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); Randolph J. May, The Public Interest
Standard: Is it Too Indeterminate to be Constitutional, 53 FED . COMM . L. J. 427 (2001) (calling
for Congressional amendment of the public interest standard, because of a conflict with nondelegation
principles); Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO
L. REV. 807 (1999); David Schoenbrod, Delegation and Democracy: A Reply to my Critics, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999); Serge Mezhburd, The Unintelligible Standard: Rethinking the
Mandate for the FTC from a Nondelegation Perspective, 57 N.Y.U. ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMER.
L. 361 (2000); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982) (arguing for a nondelegation doctrine revival based on
public choice theory); Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism, and
Administrative Power, 36 AM . U. L. REV. 295, 296 (1987) (broad delegation “deranges” virtually all
constitutional relationships). See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1237-1241 (1994) (contrasting the “true constitutional rule of nondelegation”
with the “post-New Deal positive law”). For responses to these advocates of a revival, see JERRY L.
10

3

The Benzene plurality opinion construed the Occupational Health and Safety Act11 (OSHA) to
require a finding of significant risk on statutory grounds, but responded to the Rehnquist concurrence by
stating that absent this construction the OSHA “might” offend the nondelegation doctrine.12 The
Supreme Court subsequently suggested, in a footnote in Mistretta v. United States,13 that the
nondelegation doctrine has played a significant role in statutory construction, through application of a
familiar statutory canon requiring judges to construe statutes to avoid grave doubts about a statute’s
constitutionality, when such a construction is reasonably available.14 The District of Columbia Circuit, in
two cases reviewing rulemaking under OSHA15 and the Clean Air Act16, characterized legislation as
suspect under the nondelegation doctrine and ordered the implementing agency to adopt a narrowing
construction, citing the Mistretta footnote and Benzene to support its rulings.17 Several scholars have

MASHAW , GREED , CHAOS , & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LA W 13940 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999); Peter
Schuck, Delegation & Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775
(1999). Richard Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM . U. L. REV. 323 (1987).
11

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.

12

See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 646.

13

488 U.S. 361, 373 n. 7 (1988).

See e.g. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916); Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1998).
14

15

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678, 3142-1.

16

42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671.

See American Trucking Assn’s v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing
Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980)), modified on
petition for rehearing en banc, 195 F.3rd 4, reversed in part sub. nom. Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1316
17
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argued that the nondelegation doctrine has not become dormant but has been “relocated” in the form of
numerous canons of statutory construction.18 This claim goes far beyond the claim that application of
the avoidance canon as applied to nondelegation claims serves the nondelegation doctrine, identifying
numerous clear statement rules (rules eschewing various substantive results absent explicit statements
calling for those results in statutes) with the nondelegation doctrine.19 These scholars favor the resulting
quasi-constitutional law-making,20 in the form of constitutionally motivated “construction” of statutes to

(D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7). See also International Union, UAW v.
OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding agency construction that followed the remand in the
first UAW case).
See Sunstein, supra note 4; Bressman, supra note 4,at 1409-11; Gelhorn, supra note 4, at
10232 (claiming that the lower court opinion in American Trucking was “remarkable only for its
ordinariness in applying the nondelegation doctrine in a limited sphere,” that of statutory interpretation).
This article will not focus upon theories of statutory interpretation that bear nondelegation labels, but
address concerns markedly different from those central to the nondelegation doctrine. For example,
John Manning has argued that cases barring delegation of lawmaking authority to people Congress
directly controls might justify a refusal to consider legislative history. See John F. Manning, Textualism
as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM . L. REV. 673 (1997); Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (rejecting delegation of
authority to a board under Congressional control); Ins v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (rejecting one
house veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (rejecting delegation to Congressional agents or
members). Notwithstanding the title of Manning’s article, he focuses on a limit upon who may receive
delegated authority, rather than the focus of this article, limits on what authority may be delegated at all.
See Manning, supra at 728-29 (distinguishing his self-delegation concerns from those surrounding the
nondelegation doctrine). Cf. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAND . L. REV. 1457 (2000) (rebutting Manning’s constitutional rejection of
legislative history). My article focuses upon the problem of an improper delegation of legislative
authority to a judicial or administrative body, which unquestionably has constitutional authority to
implement law passed by Congress.
18

19

See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 316 n. 5.

See generally William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND . L. REV. 593 (1992).
20

5

avoid nondelegation problems.21 These commentators support a “new” nondelegation doctrine, not as
a source of rulings holding statutes unconstitutional, but as a ground for narrow statutory construction.22
The Supreme Court’s American Trucking decision, however, dealt a blow to the new
nondelegation doctrine, by reversing the D.C. Circuit’s nondelegation ruling. The Court held that the
principle goal setting provision of the Clean Air Act - the provision requiring EPA to set health based
national ambient air quality standards -23 clearly did not offend the nondelegation doctrine24 and
declined to construe this provision to authorize consideration of cost in setting health-based air quality
standards in order to avoid the nondelegation issue.25 The Court declined to construe the statute to
avoid the constitutional issue, because Congress had decided, albeit not through a clear statement
explicitly excluding costs, that EPA should base its NAAQS decisions solely on protecting public

Sunstein, supra note 4, at 317, 341-343; Note, The Weak Nondelegation Doctrine and
American Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, 2 B.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (2000).
21

See e.g. Alex Forman, Note, A Call to Restore Limitations on Unbridled Congressional
Delegations: American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 34 INDIANA L. REV. 1476 (2001) (calling for
courts to demand limiting constructions from agencies in order to limit delegations to administrative
agencies); Bressman, supra note 4 (advocating a new nondelegation doctrine and claiming that
Supreme Court precedent supports it); Cass Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Constitutional?, 98
MICH. L. REV. 303, 337, 350 (1999) (arguing that the new nondelegation doctrine promotes rule of law
values); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 50 (1969)
(calling for administrative clarification of legislative standards); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach
to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713 (1969). Cf. Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False
Promise of the New Nondelegation Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2000) (criticizing the new
nondelegation doctrine).
22

23

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).

24

American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 (discretion allowed by section 109(b)(1) is “well within
the outer limits of our nondelegation precedent”).
25

Id. at 471.
6

health.26 So, a construction requiring EPA to consider cost was not reasonably available under the
statute.27 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the unanimous Court explicitly rejected one form of the new
nondelegation doctrine by flatly repudiating the D.C. Circuit approach of ordering administrative
agencies to narrowly construe statutes to avoid nondelegation problems as theoretically unsound.28
The issue of whether judicial statutory construction serves the nondelegation doctrine continues
to matter after American Trucking. Academic proponents of the new nondelegation doctrine have
continued to support activist judicial construction, employing numerous substantive canons of
construction.29 But scholars recognize that substantive canons of construction allow judges to engage in
quasi-constitutional law-making, accomplishing results through statutory construction that the
constitution may not directly authorize.30 The avoidance canon, in particular, may extend judicial policy
making power by creating a constitutional penumbra,31 an effective extension of scope of a

26

See id. at 465-471.

27

Id. at 471.

28

See id. at 472-73.

See Sunstein, supra note 3 (arguing for judicial activism on a variety of grounds); Cass
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001) (same). Cf. Bressman,
supra note 3, at 452-453 (calling for administrative law standards to “discipline delegation). See also
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989)
(arguing for increased activism through substantive canons); Eben Moglen and Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing Fictions of Statutory Interpretations, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203
(1990) (contesting Sunstein’s views).
29

30

See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20.

See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISES AND REFORM 285 (1985)
(“The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions . . . is to enlarge the
. . . reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant modern interpretations of the
31

7

constitutional doctrine as an influence in statutory interpretation. This implies that statutory
interpretation in the service of the nondelegation doctrine could greatly limit the scope of regulatory
programs.
Moreover, narrowing statutory construction in the service of a nondelegation doctrine might
appear attractive to federal judges, because it comports with current judicial skepticism regarding
federal regulatory power.32 The Supreme Court has become increasingly active in imposing substantive
and structural constitutional restraints upon the federal government’s regulatory powers. The Court
has limited the means Congress can employ to carry out its policy choices, restricting the use of private
damage actions to enforce federal obligations against states under principles derived from the 11th
Amendment,33 restricting the federal government’s form under separation of powers principles34 and
Constitution . . .”); William K. Kelly, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 860-65 (2001) (treating this problem as a “traditional critique” of
the avoidance canon).
See e.g. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology and the D.C. Circuit,
83 VA . L. REV. 1717, 1766 (1997) (concluding that the judges on the powerful D.C. circuit “employ a
strategically ideological approach to judging.”); Douglas T. Kendall & Eric Sorkin, Nothing for Free:
How Private Judicial Seminars are Undermining Environmental Protections and Breaking the
Public’s Trust, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 449 (2001) (describing an ideological swing toward
conservatism on the D.C. Circuit leading to “a gauntlet of hurdles” to regulation).
32

33

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (striking down order that Florida
negotiate with the Seminole Indian tribe under the Indian Gaming Act as inconsistent with the 11th
Amendment); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating federal abrogation of state immunity from private suit for patent
infringement); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527
U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating federal abrogation of state immunity from private suit for false and
misleading advertising); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (invalidating enforcement of the Fair
Labor Standards Act by a private individual against his own state in state court); Kimel v. Board of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding state immune from suit under Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (forbidding
8

limiting coercion of states under the 10th Amendment.35 Even more importantly, the Court, in a series
of 5-4 rulings, has adopted an increasingly narrow view of Congressional authority to regulate interstate
commerce36 under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution and to enforce the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment,37 the two principle constitutional sources of federal regulatory power. In

private damage actions against the states under the Americans with Disabilities Act). See generally
Symposium: State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
817 (2000).
34

Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the line item veto);
Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. 501 U.S. 252
(1991) (rejecting delegation of authority to a board under Congressional control); Ins v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983) (rejecting one house veto of agency actions); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986) (rejecting delegation to Congressional agents or members).
See e.g. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-88 (1992) (holding that the take
title provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act violate the Tenth Amendment); Printz
v. United States, 511 U.S. 898, 933-35 (1997) (holding that federal requirement that states conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers violates the Tenth Amendment). Cf. Reno v.
Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding law prohibiting states from divulging information collected by
state motor vehicle departments).
35

36

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (constitutional grant of authority to regulate
interstate commerce does not allow for federal restrictions on gun possession near schools); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (interstate commerce authority does not authorize
creation of a federal remedy for gender-based violence).
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-74 (2001) (holding that Congress may not enforce the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by requiring reasonable accommodations for the
disabled); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-627 (Congress has no power to create a private right of action
against perpetrators of gender-based violence under the 14th amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating Religious Freedom Restoration Act as outside the scope of
Congressional authority to enforce the 14th Amendment); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639-647
(federal remedy for state patent violations not appropriate under the14th Amendment); College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. at 672-75 (federal remedy for false and misleading state advertising not appropriate
under 14th Amendment). See also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On
United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000).
37

9

many of these cases limiting Congressional regulatory power, the dissenters accused the majority of
taking steps toward a return to the Lochner-era practice of applying theoretically unsound and
unworkable formalistic constitutional doctrine to advance laissez-faire goals.38
The Court’s treatment of federalism issues shows that the extension of constitutional protection
through statutory interpretation can matter even when a dormant constitutional doctrine is at stake. The
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution states that powers not granted the federal government are
reserved to the states and the people, respectively. 39 In a line of cases directly addressing the scope of
the Tenth Amendment, the Court upheld application of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)40 to state
government in Maryland v. Wirtz,41 then repudiated that position, 5-4, in National League of Cities
v. Usery.42 National League of Cities held that the FLSA, by applying to “States qua States,”43
would “impermissibly interfere [with] integral government functions,”44 thereby violating the Tenth
Amendment. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,45 however, the Court

See, e.g., Morrison, 527 U.S. at 644 (Souter J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter
J., dissenting).
38

39

U.S. Const. Amend. 10.

40

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.

41

392 U.S. 183 (1968).

42

426 U.S. 833 (1976).

43

Id. at 847.

44

Id. at 851.

45

469 U.S. 528 (1985).
10

overruled its Tenth Amendment holding in National League of Cities.46 The Garcia Court found a
state right to freedom from federal regulation of traditional government functions “unworkable” and
“unsound in principle.”47 Thus, the Court, when it directly faced the constitutional issue, emphatically
rejected the notion that the 10th Amendment immunizes traditional state governmental functions from
federal regulation.48
Yet in Gregory v. Ashcroft,49 the Court applied the avoidance canon to reach the kind of
constitutional result it rejected in National League of Cities.50

The Gregory Court, after referring to

the Tenth Amendment,51 held that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196752 did not
protect state judges from state mandatory retirement laws.53 It announced a plain statement rule
enforcing the constitutional principle it had rejected in National League of Cities, stating that the Court
will read statutes not to “intrude on state government functions” absent a plain statement in the statute
46

Id. at 557.

47

Id. at 546.

See id. at 531 (stating that the federal judiciary’s use of the 10th Amendment to immunize
traditional state governmental functions from federal regulation is unworkable and “inconsistent with
[the] established principles of federalism).
48

49

501 U.S. 452 (1991).

See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF FEDERAL POLICY 687 (1995) (Gregory
demonstrates that “what the court taketh away as constitutional protection it can revive as canonical
interpretive protection.”).
50

51

Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457, 463.

52

29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.

53

Id. at 473.
11

expressing the intent to do so.54
The Tenth Amendment experience suggests that the avoidance canon has the potential to revive
the nondelegation doctrine as a substantial restraint upon federal regulation, notwithstanding its dormant
constitutional status. Hence, the question of whether judges should interpret statutes to avoid
nondelegation issues is of vital importance.
This article argues that construction of statutes to avoid nondelegation claims poses enormous
theoretical and practical problems. Most fundamentally, a strong nondelegation claim casts doubt not
just upon the constitutionality of a statute, but also upon the constitutional authority of government
agencies and courts to adopt saving constructions. Construction to avoid serious nondelegation claims
invites, indeed may require, unconstrained judicial or administrative lawmaking.55
This article begins with a review of the nondelegation doctrine, the avoidance canon, the claim
that the nondelegation doctrine has been “relocated” in numerous statutory canons of construction, and
the argument that recent Supreme Court statutory construction reflects a revival of the dormant
nondelegation doctrine.56 It shows that the canons of construction have not played a major role in
implementing the nondelegation doctrine. It then shows that nondelegation concerns played no

54

Id. at 464.

Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, The Clean Air Act at a Crossroads: Statutory Interpretation
and Longstanding Administrative Practice in the Shadow of the Delegation Doctrine, 9 N.Y.U.
ENVTL L. J. 1, 4 (2000) (characterizing the D.C. Circuit’s holding in American Trucking as “an
unprincipled arrogation of power to the federal judiciary”).
55

56

Cf. Sunstein, supra note 4.
12

discernible role in other cases that some scholars have identified with the doctrine.57
The article’s second part develops the argument that grave doubts about the constitutionality of
a statute under the nondelegation doctrine create equally grave doubts about the constitutionality of
saving constructions. It explains why the American Trucking Court was probably correct to
disapprove of judges ordering administrative agencies to narrowly construe statutes in order to save
them from nondelegation claims. It further shows that the Court’s rationale for discouraging saving
administrative construction plausibly extends to the judiciary as well, calling into question judicial
application of the avoidance canon to avoid adjudication of nondelegation claims.
The final part addresses the problem of what courts should do when confronting a
nondelegation problem. This discussion leads to renewed respect for the value of the limits to the
application of the avoidance canon articulated in Supreme Court decisions. The Court should respect
these limits and the limits of the nondelegation doctrine itself, to prevent the constitutional problems
outlined in this article from arising frequently. Congress too must play its part, by continuing to make at
least some general policy when writing legislation.
Statutory construction offers a constitutionally unsuitable home for a revival of the nondelegation
doctrine. Ironically, in this area, construction to avoid a constitutional problem might create
constitutional dilemmas where few currently exist, with quite pernicious consequences for democratic
governance.
I. The Nondelegation Doctrine and Statutory Construction

Cf. Bressman, supra note 4, at 1401 (claiming that “Iowa Utilities Board” may be
understood to revive the dormant nondelegation doctrine).
57
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This part describes the nondelegation doctrine and the contours of the avoidance canon. It then
examines the claim that the nondelegation doctrine has been relocated in the form of numerous canons
of construction.
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
Article I of the constitution vests all legislative authority in the Congress.58 The Supreme Court
has inferred a constitutional prohibition of delegation of legislative authority from this affirmative grant of
authority.59
The constitution authorizes the executive branch to “execute” laws, so the Court has
consistently recognized that the nondelegation doctrine does not prohibit administrative agencies or
courts from filling in the details of very general statutes or from applying general principles to new
facts.60 In particular, agencies and, in some circumstances, judges, may write legislative rules
implementing Congressional legislation embodying a general policy choice.61
Nevertheless, cases involving quasi-legislative rulemaking can sometimes raise nondelegation

58

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1.

59

See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1988).

See U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 3; Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)
(Congress may delegate power to “fill up the details” under general provisions of law). See also
Manning, supra note 18, at 695 (textualists accept that agencies and courts routinely define the specific
meaning of general statutory texts).
60

See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758-59 (1996) (entities other than Congress
may write prospective rules executing a statute); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (approving agency authority to “make supplementary rules and regulations . .
.”); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 368-369, 371 (upholding delegation of authority to write sentencing
guidelines to a commission including federal judges).
61
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issues. When the executive branch enacts rules, they operate generally and prospectively, and so
resemble ordinary legislation.62 While administrative agencies sometimes make policy judgments
through case-by-case decisions, lawsuits arising under the nondelegation doctrine usually challenge
executive branch exercises of rulemaking authority.63 The challenges that have arisen outside of the
rulemaking context have been few and unsuccessful.64
The nondelegation doctrine has little substantive content. Unlike, for example, a constitutional
provision forbidding limits on speech, its strictures can apply in almost any substantive context.65 In

See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488-89 (2001) (Stevens J.,
concurring).
62

See e.g. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405-412 (1935) (challenge to
executive orders and Interior Department regulations governing oil production); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-527 (1935) (describing poultry code enacted
through an executive order); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371 (challenge to sentencing guidelines enacted by
a Sentencing Commission); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 209 (1942)
(regulation of broadcasting); Loving, 517 U.S. at 754-58 (executive order establishing aggravating
factors that can justify the death penalty’s application in cases before military tribunals); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 415, 418, 438 (1943) (Office of Price Administration’s maximum price
regulations).
63

See e.g. American Power Co. v. S.E.C. 329 U.S. 90, 96, 104-106 (1946) (upholding an
order dissolving two regulated utilities); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 743, 747-53, 774-787
(1947) (upholding orders forcing disgorgement of “excess profits” from several named companies and
individuals); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 247-250 (1946) (upholding federal takeover of Long
Beach Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n) . Lichter involved orders that applied a prior general
administrative directive elaborating the relevant statutory standard. But the petitioners did not challenge
the administrative directive itself. Instead, they sought to invalidate the specific actions undertaken
under the statute against them on the grounds that the statute itself violated the nondelegation doctrine.
64

65

I use the term “almost” because the doctrine may not apply fully when the body to whom
Congress delegates the authority has independent authority over the subject matter. See infra notes
291-292, 344-345 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the nondelegation doctrine applies quite
broadly to a wide variety of subject matter.
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other words, it prohibits all delegations of legislative authority almost regardless of subject matter, and
allows all delegations of implementation authority, again regardless of subject matter.66 Indeed, our
constitutional system routinely delegates the most drastic decisions the legal system ever makes,
decisions about who shall live and who shall die, to private bodies, juries deciding death penalty
cases.67 And the Court has upheld delegations of authority to write rules establishing the factors that
can justify imposition of the death penalty or a life sentence.68 Hence, the doctrine does not eliminate
private or executive branch implementation of important decisions or particular types of decisions.69
The modern Court has emphasized that the nondelegation doctrine responds to concerns about
separation of powers.70 Therefore, the doctrine functions as a procedural check on the form of
government, rather than as a restriction upon the substance of statutes.
For many years, the doctrine existed only in dicta. Until 1935, the Court never based a

See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 406, 430 (delegation of authority to regulate oil supplies);
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 546, 556 (1975) (delegation of authority to regulate liquor);
Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521-22, 541-42 (delegation of authority to establish codes of fair competition);
); Loving, 517 U.S. at 751, 771 (delegation of authority to establish factors justifying the death penalty
in murder cases before courts martial).
66

See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154-157 (1968) (holding that defendants facing the
death plenalty have a right to a jury trial).
67

68

See Loving, 517 U.S. 748; Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361.

Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (holding that a delegation of
authority to a private industry body that allows it to oppress competitors violates due process).
69

See Loving, 517 U.S. at 758-59 (emphasizing that delegation doctrine involves a distinction
between the power to make law and the power to execute it).
70
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constitutional ruling upon the nondelegation doctrine.71 Indeed, during this period the Court upheld
delegations of authority containing either no policy guidance at all or extraordinarily vague guidance for
implementing executive branch officials.72
In 1935, however, the Court struck down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA)73 under the nondelegation doctrine in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States74 and
Panama Refining Corp. v. Ryan.75 One of these provisions authorized the President to adopt
privately developed codes of fair competition, with very sparse guidance as to content.76 Another
authorized the President to regulate the supply of oil, but did not spell out a specific policy for this
regulation.77 The Court held, in essence, that the challenged NIRA provisions lacked intelligible

71

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373.

See e.g. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (approving delegation of authority to write the law governing execution of
judgments); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 403-04 (1928) (upholding
delegation of power to adjust tariffs when rates failed to equalize. . . differences in the cost of
production); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 497-98 (1904) (sustaining delegation of power to
“establish uniform standards” for importing tea); New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States,
287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (upholding a “public interest” standard); United States v. Grimaud, 220
U.S. 506, 515 (1911) (upholding delegation of authority to regulate the occupancy and use of forest
preserves).
72

73

Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).

74

295 U.S. 495 (1935).

75

293 U.S. 388 (1935).

76

See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521-523.

77

See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 406.
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principles to guide its implementers.78
In subsequent years, the Court consistently rejected challenges to statutes under the
nondelegation doctrine.79 It upheld, once again, delegations containing very vague policy guidance,
such as laws directing regulation serving “the public interest, necessity, or convenience”83 or authorizing
“fair and equitable” regulation.84 Such standards leave a great deal of room for agency policymaking.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the doctrine only requires the existence of a general
“intelligible” principle in authorizing legislation.85 This means that the legislation must reflect at least a
general policy that guides those implementing the statute.86 The doctrine does not require detailed
legislation.87 This view of the nondelegation doctrine forms the basis for the modern administrative
78

See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996).

79

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1988). The Court did hold that a law
delegating standard setting authority to a private industry body constituted “legislative delegation in its
most obnoxious form.” Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). It found that this
private delegation violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, rather than the
prohibition on delegating legislative authority without an accompanying intelligible principle. Id.
83

National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-217, 225-226 (1943).

84

Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 427 (1943). The statute upheld in Yakus also
identified some policy goals and factors to be taken into account in writing just and equitable price
controls. See id. at 420-27.
See Loving, 517 U.S. at 771; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73. This view of the doctrine
actually pre-dates Schechter & Panama Refining. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (delegation is not forbidden if accompanied by an “intelligible principle”).
85

See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971) (3
judge panel) (citing Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426; Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409; L. Jaffe, An Essay on
Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 COL. L. REV. 561, 569 (1947))
86

See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“Congress cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate
power under broad general directives.”).
87
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state, which relies upon legislation that authorizes administrative agencies to make subsidiary policy
judgments under fairly general legislation.88
Nevertheless, the nondelegation doctrine limits delegation to a wide variety of bodies, not just
to administrative agencies. The doctrine rests upon the assumption that Congress may not delegate
legislative authority at all, which implies that it may not delegate this authority to anybody. Historically,
the doctrine has applied to entities besides administrative agencies.
The only two cases to invalidate statutes on nondelegation grounds involved delegations of power to the
President, not just to administrative agencies.89 And the Court has repeatedly applied the doctrine to
legislative delegations of rulemaking authority to the judiciary.90 Hence, the doctrine generally applies to
delegations to any other branch of the federal government.
In practice, the Supreme Court has often accepted as evidence of compliance with the
nondelegation doctrine constraints other than an intelligible principle in authorizing legislation.91 It has

88

1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LA W TREATISE 8-9, 66
(3d ed. 1994).
See Shechter, 295 U.S. at 521-22, 525, 537-39; Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 405, 41415, 420. See also Hampton, 276 U.S. at 403-04 (upholding delegation of power to President to set
tariffs).
89

See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 1, 43 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.); Mistretta, 488
U.S. at 368-79 (considering claim that Congressional delegation of authority to write sentencing
guidelines to a judicial commission violates the nondelegation doctrine); Manning, supra note 6, at 238.
90

See generally Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 748-763; Sunstein, supra note
22, at 349-50 (discussing the idea of procedural safeguards as surrogates for the safeguards of the
nondelegation doctrine); Aranson et al., supra note 10, at 14 (referring to Meat Cutters as an
“authoritative modern statement of the procedural due process gloss on the delegation doctrine.”).
91
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suggested, at times, that judicial review,92 agency construction,93 and the existence of relevant
background legal principles94 may obviate the need for an “intelligible principle.” American Trucking,
however, rejects agency construction as an acceptable substitute.95 The Court has also never
demanded an intelligible principle when the recipient of delegated authority has adequate independent
constitutional authority over the subject matter.96
B. The Avoidance Canon
For more than 80 years, the Supreme Court has accepted the principle that the courts should
construe statutes, if reasonably possible, in a way that allows the Court to avoid resolving grave doubts
about a statute’s constitutionality.97 This rule allows the Court to avoid resolving constitutional issues
until it is absolutely necessary. This reluctance to resolve constitutional issues rests on important

See e.g. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1943). See also Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 337 F. Supp. at 759-62. Cf. Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919,
921-22 (1996) (Justices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas dissenting) (doubting that the availability of
judicial review is relevant to the question of whether a statute delegates legislative authority to an
agency).
92

See e.g. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 783 (1948) (suggesting that administrative
clarification of statutory term helps it survive nondelegation doctrine scrutiny).
93

See e.g. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (“discretion” to regulate in fields with
customary practices may exceed permissible discretion in field without such practice).
94

95

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-73.

See e.g. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1996) (nondelegation doctrine may
not apply fully to rulemaking regarding military discipline because of President’s authority as
commander-in-chief); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-557 (1975) (nondelegation
doctrine does not apply fully to delegation to an Indian Tribe).
96

See e.g. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (citing United States
Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
97
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prudential considerations. When the Court resolves a constitutional issue, it may permanently limit the
scope of future democratic decision-making. 98 If it makes a mistake in such a ruling, only a
constitutional amendment (or a rare decision to overrule precedent) can correct it.99 In most contexts,
the avoidance canon reinforces democratic decision-making by allowing statutes that the Court might
otherwise find unconstitutional to remain in effect, albeit in narrowed form.
It also serves the function of avoiding erroneous constitutional rulings upholding legislation.100
Such rulings have the potential to lend the Court’s imprimatur to the legislation’s policy, even if the
legislation’s wisdom is questionable.101 And decisions upholding legislation may permanently limit the
scope of important constitutional rights.102
Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that the avoidance canon, if applied inappropriately,
can undermine democratic decision-making by distorting the policy choices embodied in the legislation
the Court construes. For that reason, the Court has emphasized that it may only adopt “reasonably

See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1985) (discussing the principle of electoral accountability).
98

See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 BOST. COLL. L. REV.
1003, 1036 (1994). A constitutional amendment ordinarily requires ratification by three-fourths of the
state legislatures, so passage of an amendment is very difficult. See U.S. Const. art. V.
99

See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1960).
100

See e.g. Kloppenberg, supra note 99, at 1049-1050. See generally Bickel, supra note
100, at 48.
101

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (Jackson J., dissenting)
(describing ruling upholding internment of citizens of Japanese extraction under the due process clause
as a blow to liberty).
102
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available” statutory constructions, not constructions that do violence to the legislative will.103 Indeed,
this aspect of the avoidance canon played an important role in American Trucking. Since the Court
concluded that the Clean Air Act “unambiguously bars cost considerations from the . . . process” for
setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, it could not construe the Act to include cost in order to
avoid deciding the nondelegation issue raised in the case.104 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
explained, “No matter how severe the constitutional doubt, courts may choose only between
reasonably available interpretations of a text.”105
In order to avoid disruption of the democratic process through questionable construction, the
Court has also held that the canon properly applies only in the case of “grave doubt” about a statute’s
constitutionality,106 not in every case where a litigant claims that a constitutional issue exists. Indeed, in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States,107 the Court held that judges should only apply the avoidance
canon where a “serious likelihood” exists that the Court would otherwise have to strike down the
statute.108 It expressed the fear that otherwise the Court would construe statutes to avoid constitutional
issues that “upon analysis, evaporate.”109 In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court declined to apply the canon

103

See e.g. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (declining to apply canon).

104

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001).

105

Id.

106

See Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. at 401.

107

523 U.S. 224 (1998).

108

Id. at 237-38.

109

Id.
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even though the constitutional objections before it (to federal restrictions on abortion counseling) had
“some force.”110 Almendarez-Torres and subsequent cases demand that the courts examine precedent
carefully in assessing whether a grave doubt should exist about a statute’s constitutionality before
applying the avoidance canon.111
The Court is right to recognize that abuse of the avoidance canon can interfere with democratic
decision-making. Judge Posner has pointed out that a misinterpretation of a statute, while theoretically
correctable through ordinary legislation, may remain uncorrected for a long time in practice.112
Congress often fails to revise misinterpreted legislation, not because the correction is not needed or
desired, but because its members lack the time to consider all needed revisions of existing law as they
grapple with an annual budget process, new legislation, provision of constituent services, and fund
raising for coming elections.113
Prior to Almendarez-Torres, the Court has often applied the avoidance canon inconsistently,
even though the clearer statements of the avoidance canon going back to Holmes’ day have always
contained the strictures that the Court subsequently reaffirmed and rationalized in Almendarez-
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500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991).

See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 239-247 (extensively examining precedent in
determining that no grave constitutional doubt should exist). See e.g. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 239-51 (1999) (same); Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2498-2502 (2001) (same).
111

112

See POSNER, supra note 31, at 285.

See e.g. Bressman, supra note 4, at 1419 (discussing how competing bills may lessen
chances of reenacting stricken legislation); Lawrence C. Marshall, Let Congress Do It: The Case for
An Absolute Value of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 190 (1989) (same).
113
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Torres.114 The Court has followed its own doctrinal position more consistently since articulating the
reasons for the avoidance canon’s limits in Almendarez-Torres.115
C. Statutory Construction in the Service of the Nondelegation Doctrine
The avoidance canon authorizes construction to avoid grave doubts about constitutionality
under a variety of constitutional provisions.116 This section examines its application in the nondelegation
context. It also considers the claim that the nondelegation doctrine permeates statutory construction,
not just under the avoidance canon, but under a large number of other canons as well. Finally, it
addresses arguments that the nondelegation doctrine explains a recent Supreme Court case narrowly
interpreting statutes without invoking “nondelegation canons.”117
1. The Practice of Reaching, Rather than Avoiding, Nondelegation Issues
Avoidance of the nondelegation doctrine has played a very minor role in the Court’s statutory
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Almendarez-Torres, 523 at 237; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (only
authorizing avoidance if the saving construction is “fairly possible”); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241
U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (canon applies when doubts about constitutionality are “grave”).
See e.g. Jones, 526 U.S. at 239-51 (declining to apply canon where constitutional doubt is
not grave); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (declining to apply
canon where statute is clear); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (same).
115

See e.g. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (free
exercise clause of the First Amendment); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional
Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REV. 1 (1996); Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use
the Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 GA . L. REV. 85 (1995).
116

117

See Bressman, supra note 4.
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construction cases. This minor role may reflect the moribund status of the nondelegation doctrine.118
In most of the cases adjudicating litigants’ requests to narrowly construe a statute to avoid a
nondelegation problem, the Court has declined the request and reached the nondelegation issue. In a
very early nondelegation case, Wayman v. Southard,119 the Marshall Court rejected a request that it
construe the Process Act narrowly to avoid a constitutional issue about Congressional authority to
delegate the power to create law governing execution of federal judgments to the federal courts.120
The Court construed the question before it narrowly, without construing the statute narrowly. It held
that Kentucky statutes enacted after the Process Act cannot govern execution of federal judgments.121
While the Court might have avoided the constitutional issue by saying nothing more than that, it went on
to address the nondelegation issue, stating that Congress may authorize federal courts to create the law
governing execution of federal judgments.122
In later cases as well, the Court declined to avoid nondelegation issues through statutory

See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled)
Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 894 (1990) (describing
the nondelegation doctrine as “long moribund”); Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court’s Avoidance
of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More Than “A Dime’s Worth of
Difference,” 49 CATH . U. L. REV. 337, 340 (2000) (describing the nondelegation doctrine as
“currently moribund” and suggesting that the nondelegation doctrine has been moribund for some time).
118

119

23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).

See id. at 15 (arguing that construing the Process Acts to authorize “Courts to make
execution laws, would be to suppose Congress intended to violate the constitution by delegating their
legislative authority to the judiciary.”)
120

121

See id. at 48-49.

122

See id. at 50.
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construction. In 1942, broadcasters challenging Federal Communication Commission (FCC)
regulations argued that the Court must construe the Communications Act of 1934123 narrowly in order
to avoid an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.124 Instead, the Court reached and rejected
the nondelegation argument, upholding the regulations.125 Indeed, the Court, far from trying to duck the
nondelegation issue, interpreted the Act broadly to effectuate its purposes in a dynamic changing
environment.126
A Supreme Court majority has only arguably construed a statute to avoid a nondelegation
problem on one occasion, and that occasion involved an anomalous variant of the doctrine.
The relevant case, National Cable Television Ass’n., Inc. v. United States,127 involved a challenge to
fees that the FCC imposed upon owners of cable television systems. Justice Douglas’ opinion for the
Court construed the statute authorizing these fees narrowly, explaining that “Congress is the sole organ
for levying taxes” and “it would be a sharp break with our traditions to conclude that Congress had
bestowed on a federal agency the taxing power.”128 While the opinion did cite nondelegation doctrine
precedent, it may have construed the statute narrowly not to avoid a problem of delegation without a
guiding intelligible principle, but to avoid the conclusion that the statute authorized an administrative
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47 U.S.C. §§ 151-161.

124

Nat’l Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 209 (1942).

125

See id. at 215-218.

126

See id. at 219-221.

127

455 U.S. 336 (1974).

128

Id. at 341.
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agency to levy a tax.129
Justice Douglas, however, cites two nondelegation doctrine cases.130 He cites Schechter for
the proposition that Congress may not delegate “essential legislative functions.”131 In context, this
seems to suggest that Congress may not delegate any taxation authority.
But Justice Douglas then points out that Congress may delegate authority to an administrative
agency if it provides an “intelligible principle” guiding its exercise, citing a case, Hampton & Co. v.
United States,132 that upheld delegation of authority to set a tariff - a type of tax. He then states that
the “hurdles revealed in those decisions lead us to read the Act narrowly to avoid constitutional
problems.”133

The opinion, however, does not precisely identify these hurdles.134 The reference to

hurdles, in the plural, does suggest that Douglas sees not one, but at least two hurdles.135 It is possible
that the lack of an intelligible principle is one of the hurdles. But the rest of the decision casts some
doubt upon the hypothesis that a want of intelligible principle matters much to this case.136
The Court explains why the statute would violate a prohibition on implied delegation of taxation
129

Id. at 341-42.

130

Id. at 342 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529
(1935); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
131

Id.

132

276 U.S. 394.

133

National Cable, 415 U.S. at 342.

134

See id.

135

See id. at 342.

136

See id.
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authority,137 but it does not explain why the statute would raise a serious question regarding the
existence of an intelligible principle.138 Indeed, the principle that the FCC relied upon, that the charge
should cover all of the costs of regulating cable television, seems as intelligible as the principle the Court
adopted, that the charge should cover only the benefits conferred upon the industry through
regulation.139 While the Court found the delegation of taxation authority troubling, the Court did not
really decide whether a grave constitutional doubt existed regarding the requirement of an intelligible
principle at the core of the nondelegation doctrine.140
Two years later, the Court confronted the issue of whether a statute should be construed to
avoid a classic nondelegation problem, an arguable lack of an intelligible principle. In FEA v.
Algonquin SNG, Inc.141, the Court upheld Presidential imposition of license fees on oil imports under
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended142.143 The Court confronted a statute that authorized
the President to “take such action . . . as he deems necessary to adjust . . . imports” to avoid national
security threats.144 Since this statute contains only an objective- to avoid national security threats - and
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See id. at 341-342.

138

See id.

139

See id. at 341-44.

140

See id. at 340-44.

141

426 U.S. 548 (1976).

142

19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1982.

143

Id. at 550, 571.

144

Id. at 550.
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no specific policy about when and how to avoid such threats, it seems to raise a potential classic
nondelegation issue.
The Supreme Court, however, did not construe the statute to avoid the nondelegation issue. It
reversed a Court of Appeals ruling holding that this statute authorized only import quotas, but not
license fees.145
The FEA Court squarely rejected the suggestion that it should construe the statute narrowly to
avoid a nondelegation problem, finding the statute “clearly sufficient to meet any delegation attack.”146
Unlike the National Cable Television Court, the FEA Court seriously examined the content of the
nondelegation doctrine, and found that the statute presented “no looming problem of improper
nondelegation that should affect our reading” of the statute.147 And indeed, prior cases upholding
delegations of taxation authority suggested that the statute did not wholly lack intelligibility.148
The FEA Court reinterpreted National Cable Television to fit conventional nondelegation
concepts. In distinguishing that case, the FEA Court claimed that the National Cable Television
decision was “apparently motivated” by a desire to avoid the problem of having to decide whether
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Id. at 557-58.
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Id. at 558-59.

147

Id. at 559-560.

See e.g. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683-689 (1892) (giving weight to longstanding
practice of delegation of taxation authority to President, and upholding delegation of authority to levy a
tariff against nondelegation challenge); J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394
(1928) (upholding delegation of authority to President to tax imports).
148
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“open-ended” language in the general statute failed to provide an intelligible principle.149
The nondelegation doctrine also played a role in the Benzene case, Industrial Union Dep’t,
AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.150 The plurality opinion held that the Occupation Health and
Safety Administration may only regulate when it finds that a toxic substance poses a “significant risk.”151

The Benzene plurality opinion mentions the nondelegation doctrine without explicitly invoking
the avoidance canon, stating that the Occupational Safety and Health Act “might” offend the
nondelegation doctrine absent the construction the plurality adopted.152 The Benzene plurality,
however, states that its resolution of the case “turns, to a large extent” on the analysis of two specific
statutory subsections, which the opinion parses at length before briefly mentioning nondelegation.153 In
any case, the Benzene plurality decision does not involve explicit consideration of the intelligible
principle issue, an explicit application of the avoidance canon, or a majority opinion on anything.154
In footnote 7 of Mistretta v. United States,155 the Court stated, “In recent years our
149

FEA, 426 U.S. at 560 n. 10.

150

448 U.S. 607 (1980).

151

Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 662.

152

Id. at 646 (plurality opinion).

153

Id. at 639. Cf. American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 14 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Judge Silberman dissenting) (characterizing Benzene’s reference to nondelegation as a “makeweight”),
majority opinion reversed in part sub. nom. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457
(2001).
154

See Benzene Case, 448 U.S. 607.

155

488 U.S. at 373 n. 7.
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application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory
texts, and more particularly to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise
be thought unconstitutional” citing only National Cable Television and Benzene’s plurality opinion.
These applications have been few and quite questionable.
Shortly after relying upon National Cable Television in the Mistretta footnote as the only
example of a majority opinion using the nondelegation doctrine as a tool of statutory construction, the
Court revisited National Cable Television and suggested that it did not, in fact, involve a serious
nondelegation issue. In Skinner v. Mid-American Pipeline Co.,156 the Court reversed a ruling holding
that a law delegating authority to set user fees for natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines
unconstitutionally delegated taxation authority to the Executive Branch.157 In doing so, the Court
squarely rejected the proposition that the nondelegation doctrine applies more strictly to tax cases than
to other cases,158 relying upon FEA while distinguishing National Cable Television.159 Had it stopped
there, Skinner might have reinforced the FEA and Mistretta view of National Cable Television as a
case involving construction to avoid the classic nondelegation concern about intelligible principles.
The Skinner Court, however, went on to recharacterize National Cable Television in a way
that divorces it from any concern about the nondelegation doctrine generally. Justice O’Connor, writing
for the Court, states that National Cable Television “stand[s] only for the proposition that Congress

156

490 U.S. 212 (1989).

157

Id. at 214.

158

Id. at 222-23.

159

Id. at 223-24.
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must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary authority to recover
administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties . . .”160 [emphasis added].
Thus, the Skinner Court cast doubt upon the proposition that the open-ended nature of the language
governing the delegation explains National Cable Television, the hypothesis of the FEA Court.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion converts a general concern about open-ended language that might create
an unintelligible principle, into a requirement that has never been part of the nondelegation doctrine, a
requirement that a specific type of policy decision, a decision to impose monetary burdens upon
regulated industry that do not benefit them, requires a “clear statement.”161 This amounts to a strong
statutory presumption favoring industries burdened by fees and has little to do with the nondelegation
doctrine’s concern about the existence, rather than the substantive direction, of a governing legislative
principle.
The Court has never addressed in detail the wisdom or constitutionality of applying the
avoidance canon to avoid nondelegation issues. In practice, however, the Court has often sought to
reach, rather than avoid, nondelegation issues. The one possible exception seems anomalous and has
been subsequently construed by the Court to have little connection with constitutional concerns about
nondelegation. Hence, the Court has never clearly applied the avoidance canon just to avoid a real
nondelegation issue.
2. The Claim that Numerous Canons of Construction Embody a
Nondelegation Doctrine

160

Id. at 224 (emphasis added).

161

Id.
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Notwithstanding this evidence that the nondelegation doctrine has played little or no role in the
Supreme Court’s construction of statutes, Cass Sunstein argues that the nondelegation doctrine is “alive
and well” in the realm of statutory construction.162 He claims that it has been relocated from its home as
a constitutional basis for invalidating legislation to a set of holdings that “federal administrative agencies
may not engage in certain activities unless and until Congress . . . expressly” authorizes them.163 Thus,
Sunstein identifies the nondelegation doctrine with clear statement rules.164 He cites as examples a large
number of substantive canons of construction, some of which are often implemented without a clear
statement requirement. These include the rule of lenity,165 the avoidance canon, 166 the statutory
presumption that legislation only applies domestically,167 and several other substantive canons of
construction.168
This subsection will show that these canons do not implement a nondelegation doctrine. As
Sunstein acknowledges, the Supreme Court has never claimed that these canons (excepting the

162

Sunstein, supra note 4, at 315.

163

Id. at 316.

See id. at 316 n. 5 (the nondelegation canons are all clear statement rules). Sunstein’s
examples, however, include cases that do not invoke clear statement rules or any canon of construction.
See e.g. id. at 331 n. 79 (citing National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 880
F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
164

165

Id. at 332.

166

Id. at 331.

167

See id. at 333.

168

See id. at 334-335.
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avoidance canon as applied to nondelegation claims) implement the nondelegation doctrine.169
Moreover, they reflect no particular concern with the problem that Sunstein focuses upon,
delegation to administrative agencies.170 Sunstein claims that these are nondelegation canons because
they “forbid agencies from making decisions on their own,”171 but the canons he cites affect all
substantive interpretation within the policy concern of the canon, regardless of whether an agency has
an interpretive role, and the cases he cites say nothing about agency decision-making.
For example, Sunstein refers to a canon that “agencies are not permitted to apply statutes
outside the territorial borders of the United States.”172 The case he cites for this proposition, EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co.,173 simply does not prohibit agency application of a statute abroad.
Indeed, the case involved review of a district court application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to a lawsuit brought by a private party, not an agency application of the statute.174 The Court
held that unless Congress has “clearly expressed” an intent to regulate conduct oversees, it will only
apply domestically.175 The case thus embodies a strong principle of construction that applies to all
See id. at 316 (acknowledging that, “as a technical matter” the holdings he relies upon are
not based on the nondelegation doctrine).
169

170

Sunstein recognizes that some clear statement rules are not nondelegation canons, “because
they do not involve agencies at all.” Id. at 316 n.5. But, as shown below, the cases Sunstein cites do
not involve agencies in any significant way either.
171

Id. at 316.

172

Id. at 316.

173

499 U.S. 244 (1998).

174

See id. at 247.

175

Id. at 248.
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legislation, not just to statutes delegating authority to agencies. Any limitation on agency conduct would
be purely incidental.
Consider another example, the rule of lenity, which counsels courts to construe criminal statutes
narrowly.176 Most criminal statutes do not delegate any broad rulemaking authority to administrative
agencies.177 And the Supreme Court’s lenity decisions do not address Sunstein’s theme of limiting
See e.g. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (rule of lenity “ensures fair
warning” by confining scope of a criminal prohibition to matters “clearly covered.”); United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (rule of lenity promotes fair notice, minimizes risk of arbitrary
enforcement, and maintains the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts); Crandon
v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1989) (rule of lenity assures fair warning and that legislatures
rather than courts define criminal liability); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1986);
(narrowly construing mail fraud statute rather than leaving its outer boundaries ambiguous); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1984) (rule of lenity provides concerning conduct rendered illegal
and strikes “the appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court of defining
criminal liability.”); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971) (rule of lenity provides fair
warning and assures that finding of criminality reflects moral condemnation of the community by making
sure that legislatures, not courts, define crimes); Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1979)
(rule of lenity applies to interpretation of penalty provisions of criminal statutes).
176

See e.g. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 177 (Scalia J., concurring) (“the law in question, a criminal
statute, is not administered by any agency but by the courts.”). Cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter,
Communities for Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 704 n. 18 (1995) (Court has applied rule of lenity
where no regulations are present, but never suggested that the lenity rule provides a standard for
reviewing regulations enforced through criminal sanctions). To be sure, prosecutors, the police, and
judges must interpret criminal statutes in order to enforce the law. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949
(statute if construed as government requests would delegate to prosecutors and juries the “legislative
task” of determining what type of coercive activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be
punished as crimes.”). Cf. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 177 (Scalia J., concurring) (discussing opinions of
government lawyers advising clients about scope of criminal bribery statute). But individual judgments
by prosecutors and police about a statute’s meaning do not generally create prospective rules governing
the conduct of all future actors subject to the legislation. See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949 (suggesting
that government interpretation of involuntary servitude statutes would “provide almost no objective
indication of the conduct or condition they prohibit.”). Cf. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law,
Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 757, 789-810 (1999)
(discussing mechanisms of more broadly controlling prosecutorial discretion). In this respect,
prosecutorial and police judgments differ markedly from exercises of quasi-legislative rulemaking
177
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agency action.
The rule of lenity also illustrates another problem with Sunstein’s “nondelegation canons,” they
implement policies that have little connection to the nondelegation doctrine.178 The rule of lenity
assures that people have notice of what conduct will trigger criminal sanctions.179 It also limits arbitrary
law enforcement.180 The nondelegation doctrine serves neither goal.
Statutes raising nondelegation problems by authorizing agency regulation generally do not raise
a notice problem, because they do not regulate private conduct directly, unlike a criminal statute. Even
the complete absence of standards in a statute delegating rulemaking authority to an administrative
agency creates no issue of notice to private parties; they will get notice from the rules an agency enacts
pursuant to the statute.181
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that delegation under broad standards creates

authority that can raise serious questions under the nondelegation doctrine.
See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 316 (acknowledging that “as a technical matter” the key
holdings of the cases he relies upon are not based on the nondelegation doctrine)
178

179

See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 266 (rule of lenity assures “fair warning”).

180

See Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.

See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (“The exercise of a delegated
authority to define crimes may . . . supply” adequate “notice”); Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States,
327 U.S. 614, 622 (1946) (public looks to regulations to provide notice of what conduct is criminal);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 435 (1943) (publication of regulations in the federal register
gives adequate notice for purposes of due process). Accord Seidenfeld &
Rossi, supra note 22, at 10 (agency rules provide the certainty regulated parties need to know whether
their conduct violates the law).
181
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no problem of notice, as long as implementing regulations provide sufficient clarity.182 The Court’s

See Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614. 621-22 (1945) (applying the rule of
lenity to the regulation, because the regulation, not the underlying statute, must provide notice of what
conduct is criminal); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 435 (1943) (publication of regulations in
the federal register gives adequate notice for purposes of due process). While the case law does not
support the view that the lenity canon aims to limit delegation of the authority to define criminal offenses
to agencies, a minor element in the doctrine does recognize some reluctance to delegate such authority
to courts. This reluctance, however, has no connection with Sunstein’s theory that the nondelegation
canons serve a nondelegation doctrine by limiting agency action.
The concern about delegation really revolves around interpretive authority rather separate from
the nondelegation doctrine’s concern with delegation of legislative authority. Judicial decisions
interpreting criminal statutes may operate prospectively by binding subsequent decisions. But judicial
decisions in the criminal area usually come from efforts to adjudicate the scope of a particular
defendant’s rights, so they might be better thought of as part of the interpretation and enforcement
process, not as an exercise of legislative authority.
The rationale expressing concern about delegation to courts originated late in the long history of
the rule of lenity, in the Court’s 1971 decision in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336. The Bass
Court stated:
182

Because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community,
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. This policy embodies the instinctive
distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should. Id.
at 347-48.
This dictum’s opposition to delegation to the judiciary on grounds of democratic theory, while repeated
in subsequent decisions, has dubious salience, for the Court does accept judicial clarification of the
definition of criminal conduct, when it provides sufficient notice to defendants. See id. at 347-349. The
Court considers judicial interpretation when deciding whether a statute is sufficiently ambiguous to
invoke the rule of lenity, declining to apply the rule of lenity when judicial interpretation has sufficiently
clarified a statutory definition of criminal conduct, and recognizes that the exercise of delegated
authority to define crimes may be sufficient to provide adequate notice. See e.g. Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n. 17 (1994) (rule of lenity not applied because case law clarifies mens rea
requirement); Loving, 517 U.S. at 768 (“The exercise of delegated authority to define crimes may be
sufficient. . . to supply” adequate notice to defendants). Later decisions sometimes reinterpret Bass as
supporting something less than a doctrine opposing delegation to the judiciary, namely the “proper
balance of authority between the legislature, prosecutors, and the judiciary,” impliedly recognizing that
notice and arbitrariness, not a blanket prohibition upon a class of judicial decisions, remains at the heart
of the rule of lenity. See e.g. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427 (rule of lenity strikes “the appropriate balance
between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the court of defining criminal liability.”); Kozminski, 487
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recent decision not to apply the lenity canon in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities of
Greater Oregon,183 illustrates the lack of connection between notice concerns and nondelegation
concerns. Babbitt upheld the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of a statutory prohibition upon
“taking” endangered species as reaching conduct that harmed the species by modifying its habitat.184
Since the Endangered Species Act185 provides for criminal penalties for willful taking of species,
respondents argued that the rule of lenity applies.186 The Court rejected the suggestion that the rule of
lenity should provide the standard for reviewing challenges to administrative regulations that can be
criminally enforced.187 The Court did not consider any possible ambiguity in the governing statute
germane to the question of whether the defendants would have adequate notice without the narrowing
construction of the legislation they proposed.188 Rather, the Court suggested that notice may come
from the regulations themselves, which define precisely what taking an endangered species means under
the statute.189 The Court conceded that a regulation might in some circumstances provide inadequate

U.S. at 952 (rule of lenity promotes fair notice, minimizes risk of arbitrary enforcement, and maintains
the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts).
183

515 U.S. 687 (1995).

184

Id. at 691, 708.

185

16 U.S.C.. §§ 1531-44.

186

Sweet Home, 515 U.S.. at 704 n.18.

187

Id.

188

See id. at 704 n.18.

189

Id.
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notice of potential liability and therefore offend the rule of lenity.190 But the regulation challenged in
Sweet Home provides adequate notice, because it “gives a fair warning of its consequences” and “has
existed for two decades.”191 No connection exists between the nondelegation doctrine and the central
concern of the lenity canon, the notice concern.
The lenity canon’s concern with arbitrary law enforcement (primarily by courts and the police)
also has little connection to the nondelegation doctrine’s concern that Congress should not delegate
legislative authority to agencies. Indeed, the nondelegation doctrine has less connection to the very
separate concern about arbitrary administrative agency action then many suppose, for reasons set out in
the margins.192
190

Id.

191

Id. The Court also recognized that administrative regulation can serve the function of
identifying criminal conduct with greater clarity in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) v.
American Broadcasting Company, 347 U.S. 284, 289-90 n. 7 (1954). The FCC Court held that
radio and television give-away programs did not constitute statutorily prohibited broadcast of a lottery,
notwithstanding an FCC regulation bringing give-aways within the ambit of the statute. Id. at 285, 290.
The Court found that give-aways did not constitute a lottery because the audience provided no
consideration for its chance to win a prize, relying, in part, upon prior construction by the Postal
Department and the Department of Justice. Id. at 290-295. Dictum in the case does apply the lenity
canon to support this result. Id. at 296. The FCC Court applied the canon mechanically, without
explicitly discussing why it should be necessary in the face of a clarifying regulation. Id. But the Court
may have been concerned about ambiguity arising from the inconsistency between the Department of
Justice’s position and that of the FCC, which would certainly interfere with the clarifying function of
administrative construction. See id. at 294-96. My general claim is not that the rule of lenity can never
play a role in judicial review of agency action, but that the rule of lenity does not aim to limit delegation
so much as provide notice, a function sometimes performed by regulations clarifying general statutory
language.
192

While the rule of lenity seeks to limit arbitrary law enforcement, the nondelegation doctrine
does not address the question of whether an agency exercises its authority arbitrarily. The
nondelegation doctrine prohibits delegation of legislative authority completely, regardless of how the
agency exercises the legislative authority granted. In public law, the Administrative Procedure Act’s
39

The claim that the rule of lenity serves as a home for a relocated nondelegation doctrine does
not withstand scrutiny. The lenity canon encourages adequate notice of what conduct will be criminal
and limits arbitrary law enforcement, whilst the nondelegation doctrine serves neither purpose, focusing
on opposition to delegation of legislative authority.193
(APA’s) arbitrary and capricious test, rather than the nondelegation doctrine, checks arbitrary agency
exercise of authority. See Patricia Ross McCubbin, The D.C. Circuit Gives New Life to the
Nondelegation Doctrine in American Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, 19 VA . J. ENVTL. L. 57, 78 -79
(2000).
Agencies may act arbitrarily regardless of the breadth of a delegation. For example, imagine a
statute that requires EPA to ban all chemicals killing more than 100 people, a rather specific statute.
EPA could apply this very arbitrarily, by concluding that a chemical kills 100 people, even though less
than 100 people are exposed to the chemical. This would be arbitrary, because it is impossible to die
from a chemical without any exposure to it.
Also, an agency may act reasonably under very broad delegations of authority. For example,
consider the code of fair competition at issue in Schechter. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 490, 521-525 (1935) (describing the codes). The Schechter Court found
the legislative mandate to create these codes provided almost no guidance as to their content. See id.
at 541 (statute “sets up no standards, aside from the statement of general aims of rehabilitation,
correction, and expansion.”). But President Roosevelt could have approved codes that did nothing
more than prevent one manufacturer from passing off his goods as that of another company. Cf. id. at
531 (identifying pawning of goods as unfair competition at common law). Surely, this would constitute
reasonable implementation of a statute authorizing creation of fair competition codes. The intelligibility
of a legislative mandate and the general reasonableness of agency action under the mandate are
analytically separable.
Indeed, a broader statutory mandate should increase the number of non-arbitrary actions an
agency may take. For example, while an agency may act arbitrarily to ban a chemical that less than
100 people are exposed to under a statute that only authorizes action if more than 100 people die from
exposure to the chemical, that same action would not necessarily be arbitrary under a statute directing
the agency to write “good environmental policy.” An agency may reasonably conclude that “good
environmental policy” requires no deaths and adequately justify regulating a substance posing high risks
to a small population under such a broad standard. Hence, the nondelegation doctrine does not serve
as a limit to arbitrary agency action.
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174 (1952)); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 n. 15 (1931); Henry Friendly, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 209 (1967)) (describing
policy supporting the rule of lenity).
193
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The avoidance canon does not generally serve the values of the nondelegation doctrine
either.194 The avoidance canon’s primary traditional purpose has been to help the Court avoid
constitutional rulings that would limit the range of decisions open to democratic decision-making or
permanently limit constitutional rights, as the Court has said repeatedly.195 The avoidance canon
generally does not seek to discourage delegation of legislative authority to agencies, even legislative
authority in a particular area where constitutional questions might arise.196
Sunstein argues that the purpose of the avoidance canon is to require Congress to raise
See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (avoidance canon
minimizes disagreement with Congress by preserving enactments that might otherwise “founder upon
constitutional objections.”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (stating that avoidance canon reflects
respect for Congress, which the Court assumes legislates with constitutional limitations in mind). I leave
the discussion of whether the avoidance canon serves the values of the nondelegation doctrine when
applied to avoid a nondelegation issue to later in the paper, showing that even in that context, it does
not serve nondelegation values.
194

See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 238 (avoidance doctrine serves the “basic democratic
function of maintaining a set of statutes that reflect” elected representatives’ policy choices); Rust, 500
U.S. at 190 (emphasizing canon’s role in saving a statute).
195

196

Sunstein refers to the avoidance canon as the canon that “agencies will not be permitted to
construe statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional doubts.” Sunstein, supra note 4, at
331. But the case he cites for the existence of this canon, Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988), does not refer to the avoidance canon. Instead, the Court held that “a
statutory grant of rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the
power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express terms.”
Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208-09. The majority made no mention of a constitutional issue to avoid. And
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, stated that the “issue here is not constitutionality.” Id. at 223.
The avoidance canon, while irrelevant to Bowen, does exist. But it applies to statutes that do
not delegate authority to administrative agencies as well as to statutes that delegate authority to
agencies. The more specific “nondelegation canon” that Sunstein mentions, that agencies in particular
may not construe statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional doubts, does not exist. See
Rust, 500 U.S. at 190-91 (contrasting petitioners’ claim that regulations raising serious questions must
be invalidated with cases holding that statutes generally must be given a construction that avoids grave
constitutional doubts if fairly possible).
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constitutional issues only through an explicit statement and prohibit agencies from raising these issues
through their interpretation, but cites no authority to support that view.197 The Court has never stated
that the avoidance canon has a general purpose of prohibiting agencies from raising constitutional issues
through interpretation.198 Nor does the avoidance canon require Congress to raise issues through
explicit statement, for the Court has sometimes declined to apply the avoidance canon to unclear
statutory language when legislative history or statutory structure, rather than a clear statement, make
Congressional intent reasonably clear.199
To be sure, the Court has sometimes applied clear statement rules to serve quasi-constitutional
values.200 Some of these clear statement rules, such as the rule discouraging legislation infringing in

197

Sunstein, supra note 4, at 331.

Cf. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 238 (canon minimizes disagreement among branches
and is followed out of respect for Congress); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1999)
(canon reflects a respectful assumption that Congress legislates “in light of constitutional limitations”).
The canon has sometimes been invoked in the face of an administrative interpretation, but the Court has
never suggested that the canon has any special role to play in limiting administrative agencies. See e.g.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574-78 (1987) (holding that
avoidance canon trumps Chevron deference and treating the case as an ordinary avoidance canon
question); See generally Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of
Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 609-10, 636-46 (1995) (identifying
the kind of textualism Sunstein advocates here with a “disciplinarian approach toward statutory
interpretation which tends to narrow the scope of regulatory legislation”).
198

See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-238 (declining to avoidance canon when
structure, legislative history, title of statutory amendments make Congressional intent clear); Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (since statute clearly excludes cost, albeit
without a clear statement explicitly excluding them, avoidance canon does not apply). See also
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 577-78, 583-88 (1987)
(suggesting that avoidance canon would not apply if legislative history clearly called for regulation of
hand billing).
199

200

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20.
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certain ways upon state sovereignty, do have a goal of demanding legislative specificity.201 But clear
statement rules do not have the purpose of avoiding delegation of legislative authority to an agency.
Indeed, many of the relevant cases arose in contexts where formal agency interpretation played little or
no role.202 Rather, clear statement rules ensure that the legislature gives the quasi-constitutional value
the clear statement rule protects careful consideration. 203 It does not constitute a general requirement
that Congress itself, rather than administrative agencies, carefully consider all policy details.
Sunstein defends his “nondelegation canons” on the grounds that the canons only restrict agency
discretion when the substantive values the canons protect are at issue.204 But that suggests that the
canons are not really aimed at the nondelegation problem at all, rather they limit agency discretion, if at
all, incidentally and for other reasons.205 Hence, calling them nondelegation canons is misleading.

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61, 467 (1990) (requiring Congress to make
its intention to alter the balance between the states and the federal government unmistakably clear in the
statutory language).
201

See e.g. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 455-74 (not mentioning any agency interpretation of statute);
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247 (1998) (adjudicating district court, rather than
agency application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
202

203

Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461 (clear statement rule “assures that the legislature has in fact faced”
the federalism issue) [citations omitted]; Harold J. Krent, Avoidance and its Costs: Application of
the Clear Statement Rule to Supreme Court Review of NLRB Cases, 15 CONN. L. REV. 209, 212
(1983) (clear statement rules “prod Congress” to consider rights arguably infringed by the statute).
204

See id. at 338.

205

A similar objection applies to Sunstein’s efforts to link the nondelegation doctrine to the void
for vagueness doctrine. See id. at 320. That doctrine generally applies to criminal statutes, because of
the concern of criminalizing unspecified conduct, but not to regulatory statutes. See City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (vagueness doctrine applies to criminal statutes lacking a scienter
requirement).
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Sunstein’s very modest normative claim about the value of substantive canons as a new home
for a nondelegation doctrine does not justify more widespread use of substantive canons. He claims
that this new “nondelegation doctrine” suffers from fewer vices than the traditional nondelegation
doctrine.206 A normative case for the proliferation of such canons or more frequent application of
existing canons would have to show that this alternative is better than the existing applications of the
existing canons. But Sunstein does not make such a claim, at least not generally.207 Nevertheless,
Sunstein has advocated expansion of the catalogue of substantive canons, even when no constitutional
values are at stake.208 In particular, Sunstein has argued for a presumption favoring cost-benefit
analysis,209 a position the American Trucking Court, with the exception of Justice Breyer, declined to
embrace.210

206

See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 338.

207

See id.

See Sunstein, supra note 29. Professor Sunstein presents his argument for expansion of
canons as a mere description of existing law. But he recognizes that the “default principles” he
advocates “remain mostly the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.” Id. at 1654. His article advocates an expansion in two senses. First, the D.C.
Circuit has not canonized the interpretations that Sunstein relies upon; it has not generally claimed that
the particular interpretations Sunstein relies upon amount to general principles of construction. So, by
seeking to identify a set of interpretations of particular statutes as containing generally applicable
principles, Sunstein effectively seeks to canonize these cases and thereby extend their influence.
Second, by seeking to defend, not just describe them, Sunstein effectively advocates their spread
beyond the D.C. Circuit.
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Id. at 1655; Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 1059, 1095 (2000).
209

See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (majority opinion)
(in order to show that costs may be considered, respondents “must show a textual commitment of
authority to the EPA to consider costs . . .”). Cf. Id. at 490 (Breyer J., concurring) (Court should
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Moreover, a major criticism that Sunstein makes of the nondelegation doctrine as a
constitutional doctrine applies to many of the canons he defends. He argues that judicial rulings about
whether legislation is too vague to withstand nondelegation scrutiny require judgments of degree not
susceptible to control through reasonably clear legal rules.211 In practice, he states, these judgments will
likely depend on the judge’s substantive policy views, with judges more likely to find a statute too
vague when they disagree with a statute’s policy.212
This problem of judgments depending on judicial policy views applies to substantive canons of
construction. Judges choose the values the substantive canons protect.213 While some of these values
may have constitutional roots, some do not.214 When the Court, as it did in Skinner, makes these kinds
of policy judgments they seem quite troubling. The Skinner Court does not explain why Congress
must issue a clear statement when imposing fees that force industries to internalize external costs, but
may rely upon more general language to impose narrower fees only recapturing regulatory benefits for
industry. The Court has certainly provided no constitutional support for judicial authority to prefer
narrower over broader fees.

generally read statutory silences or ambiguities as permitting consideration of cost).
211

See Sunstein, supra note 4, at 326-27.
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Id. at 327.

See generally Krent, supra note 203, at 217 (clear statement rules may allow Court to
“graft its values into a statute.”)
213

See id. at 245 (discussing the Justices’ tendency to radiate “consideration for
subconstitutional issues in applying clear statement rules”). Cf. Sunstein, supra note 29 (proposing a
number of non-constitutional substantive canons).
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Judges also must make judgments of degree not susceptible to legal rules about when
Congressional intent is clear enough to stand in face of a substantive canon favoring a contrary
policy.215 Commentators have criticized some of these judgments as laden with poorly justified value
judgments.216
I do not mean to argue that the substantive canons are necessarily bad. But their defects are
very similar to the defects that Sunstein (and many others) recognize in the nondelegation doctrine.217
In any case, Sunstein’s loose canons are not shooting at the nondelegation problem. If we start
re-aiming them to do so, their targets and their hits may be as erratic as a revitalized nondelegation
doctrine.218
3. The Claim that Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Cases
Revive the Nondelegation Doctrine.

See Krent, supra note 203, at 209 (“Courts enjoy great latitude in deciding . . .which
statutes” may receive “fairly possible” saving construction). See e.g. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1991) (dissenting opinion) (clear-statement rules compel selection of “less
plausible” constructions and exclude extrinsic aids to interpretation); Landgraf v. USI Film Products,
511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (recognizing that Congress superseded EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.’s
holding).
215

See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 629-646 (discussing some of these choices);
William N. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA . L. REV. 1007, 1010
(1989) (expressing concerns about the values the Justices have chosen to defend through substantive
canons of construction).
216

See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 321-28 (discussing the defects of the nondelegation
doctrine); Krent, supra note 203 (documenting in detail the inconsistency of judicial applications of a
clear statement rule in labor cases based on shifting judicial policy preferences).
217

See Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 22, at 10 (allowing courts to “override general legal
requirements” to serve a nondelegation doctrine is “neither principled nor predictable”).
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Professor Bressman has recently argued that AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board219 “may be
understood to revive the dormant nondelegation doctrine.”220 But Professor Bressman acknowledges
that the Iowa Utilities Board decision neither mentioned the term nondelegation nor cited
nondelegation cases.221
A natural reading of the case suggests that this case involves routine, albeit intricate, statutory
interpretation, rather than the concerns of the nondelegation doctrine.222 The passage Professor
Bressman focuses on223 as a supposed use of the nondelegation doctrine evaluates a claim that a
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) Order224 conflicted with a local competition provision of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act)225. The local competition provisions seek to assure
competition in a deregulated telecommunications market by providing competitors with access to
elements of local telephone company networks.226 The relevant section of the FCC Order provided
219

525 U.S. 366 (1999).

220

See Bressman, supra note 4, at 1401.

221

Id.

See Iowa Utilities, 525 U.S. at 392 (“Because the Commission has not interpreted the
terms of the statute in reasonable terms, we must vacate” the unbundled access rule). [emphasis
added]. Accord Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 22, at 17-18; Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common
Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1692,
1704, 1723-1726 (2001).
222

223

Iowa Utilities, 525 U.S. at 386-90. See Bressman, supra note 4, at 1431-38.

224

In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 11 FCC Red 15499 (1996).
225

47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2).

226

See Iowa Utilities, 525 U.S. at 371-73.
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the rules governing this access - referred to as unbundling.227
The Court read the telecommunications law as delegating authority to regulate these decisions
to the FCC, so no issue of unconstitutional delegation to private parties existed under the statute.228
Indeed, under the views of the dissenting Justices, which read the grant of regulatory authority to the
FCC as not reaching the unbundling provisions, there would be no delegation to private parties under
this statute, because the state commissions would then implement the unbundling provisions with no
FCC guidance.229 Nevertheless, Professor Bressman claims that the Iowa Utility Board Court
invoked a “prohibition on private lawmaking” as a ground for its decision.230
Furthermore, the statute contained a policy to guide implementing agencies’ determination of
what unbundled services local phone companies must make available to competitors.231 That policy
required consideration of whether the “network element” in question “is necessary”232 and “would
impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks

227

See id. at 373-74.

228

See id. at 382-83.

See id. at 413 (Breyer, J. dissenting in part, and concurring part) (claiming that the lack of
federal rulemaking authority is required in order to protect state jurisdiction over the unbundling rules
that Professor Bressman’s analysis focuses upon).
229

230

See Bressman, supra note 4, at 1401.

See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. at 351 n. 2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3)) (describing
the general duty to make “network elements” available).
231

This requirement only applies to “proprietary” elements under the statute. See 42 U.S.C. §
251(d)(2)(A).
232
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to offer.”233 Although the Court drops not a hint that this “necessity” and “impairment” standard lacks
an intelligible principle, Bressman claims the Court invoked “the requirement of limiting standards,”
which she refers to as a nondelegation principle.234
Professor Bressman finds a nondelegation doctrine revival in the Court’s interpretation of
language requiring the Commission to consider impairment and necessity.235 The Court quite naturally
read this standard as requiring a commission decision as whether a lack of access to a desired network
element was necessary and would impair service.236 It concluded, however, that the FCC regulation
did not provide for the statutorily required Commission impairment determination, a violation not of the
nondelegation doctrine, but of the statute.237 The Court objected to “entrants, rather than the
Commission” determining whether the necessity and impairment standards are met.238 But that
objection flowed from the language in the statute requiring “the Commission” to consider the necessity
and impairment factors, not from any constitutional objection to delegation to private parties.239
The Court held that “the Act requires the FCC to apply some limiting standard, rationally

233

Id. at 388 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2)).

234

Bressman, supra note 4, at 1401.

See id. at 1431-38; Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. at 388-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
251(d)(2)).
235

236

See id. at 388-89.

237

See id.

238

See id. at 389.

239

See id. at 388-89.
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related to the goals of the Act.”240 In context, the Court objected not to Congressional failure to limit
the Commission, nor to the Commission’s failure to limit itself,241 but to the FCC’s failure to write
regulation broadly enough to limit carrier claims to access in keeping with the statutory impairment and
necessity standard. Indeed, the Court objected to a limitation on Commission authority, a categorical
decision to exclude evidence that access to a particular network element was not necessary because
available from somebody other than the local carrier.242

The Court’s elaboration of that statement

makes plain that the FCC regulation did not provide for any serious Commission check upon claims
that a particular element was necessary and impaired service.243 It based this claim not upon the
regulation’s breadth, but upon its narrowness.244
American Trucking provides further evidence that the Court’s call for limiting principles and
FCC decisions reflected a reading of statutory requirements not influenced by nondelegation concerns.
Several petitioners cited Iowa Utilities Board to the Court as authority for the D.C. Circuit’s practice
of requiring agencies to construe mandates narrowly to address potential nondelegation concerns.245

240

Id. at 388 [emphasis on “Act” added, emphasis on “some” in original].

Cf. Bressman, supra note 4 at 1401 (describing Iowa Utilities Board as requiring the
agency to limit its own discretion).
241

242

See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. at 389.

See id. at 391 (claiming that FCC read the statute as requiring access whenever technically
feasible, without a real showing of necessity or impairment).
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See id. at 388-89 (explaining that exclusion of consideration of alternative service providers
rendered regulation inconsistent with the statute).
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245

Brief for the Respondents Appalachian Power Co., et al. at 24, Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257) (citing Iowa Utilities Board to support the
50

The unanimous Court not only rejected the D.C. Circuit approach, it declined to even cite Iowa Utility
Board while discussing the new nondelegation doctrine, thus suggesting that it found the case irrelevant
to nondelegation issues.246 The American Trucking Court cites Iowa Utility Boards for the
proposition that agency interpretation may not go beyond the range of the ambiguities in the statute, in a
portion of the opinion addressing a statutory interpretation issue with no link to the nondelegation
problem.247
Bressman also claims that Kent v. Dulles248 revives the nondelegation doctrine.249 Kent, like
Iowa Utilities Board, does not explicitly mention the nondelegation doctrine.250 But Kent, unlike Iowa
Utilities Board, refers to the doctrine through citation.251 Kent’s passing reference to nondelegation,
however, has little to do with the case’s holding.
Kent holds that the Secretary of State cannot deny an applicant a passport based on the

proposition that "where an agency construes a statute to provide no legal standard at all to constrain its
discretion, the courts properly have questioned that construction under the nondelegation doctrine.").
246

Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (containing no
citation to Iowa Utilities Board).
247

See id. at 481.

248

357 U.S. 116 (1957).

See Bressman, supra note 4, at 1409 (citing Kent as “an example” of statutory construction
as a surrogate for the nondelegation doctrine). See also Aranson et al., supra note 10, at 12 (Justice
Douglas “reasoned” that a broad interpretation of the statute might “render the statute an invalid
delegation.”)
249

250

Cf Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.

251

See id. (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935)).
51

applicant’s beliefs and associations.252 Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court found that the right to
travel constitutes a “liberty” protected by the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.253 The Kent
Court construed the statute authorizing discretionary denials of passports to avoid infringement of this
liberty interest.254
The statute involved would seem to pose a serious nondelegation problem even under the
modern nondelegation doctrine, for it authorizes denial of passports “under such rules as the President
shall designate.”255 It thus contains, at least on its face, no policy at all to guide the Secretary of State
or the President.
Yet, at the outset of the opinion the Court suggests its lack of concern with the nondelegation
doctrine. The majority opinion states that “the key to the problem . . . is in the manner in which the
Secretary’s discretion has been exercised, not in the bare fact that he has discretion.”256 This suggests
no concern at all about the absolute breadth of discretion, but rather a concern about its exercise to
curtail a specific constitutional right.
The Court ultimately declined to “find in this broad generalized power [to deny passports] an
authority to trench so heavily on” citizens’ rights.257 Along the way Justice Douglas notes that standards

252

See id. at 130-31.

253

See id. at 125.

254

See id. at 127-130.

255

See id. at 123 (citing Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat. Part 2, 887).

256

See id. at 125.

257

Id. at 129.
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governing delegated authority to deny passports “must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the accepted
tests.”258 A citation to Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan259 suggests that the nondelegation doctrine is
one of the tests that the standards governing delegated authority must pass.260 But the Court in no way
relies upon the nondelegation doctrine, or its avoidance, to sustain its holding.
Indeed, if one believes that the delegation of authority to deny passports without any policy
guidance violates the nondelegation doctrine, then the Court’s construction did not cure this problem.
The Court’s decision cuts out only one ground for denial, denial based on the beliefs and associations
of the applicant.261 The decision otherwise leaves the Secretary of State free to grant or deny
passports as he sees fit, with no policy guidance at all from Congress. But it should not surprise careful
readers that the Kent Court does not solve a nondelegation problem through construction, because it
did not seek to address a nondelegation problem.
The advocates of a new nondelegation doctrine should remember that the term “nondelegation
doctrine” provides a shorthand reference to the doctrine that Congress cannot delegate its legislative
authority. When the Court narrows a delegation, not because of the legislative character of the power
delegated, but because of its specific substantive content, it does not implement the nondelegation
doctrine, i.e. the doctrine disapproving of all delegations of legislative authority. It implements some
other constitutional or policy norm.
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Id.

259

293 U.S. 388 (1935).

260

See Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.

261

See id. at 130.
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A large literature exists discussing the problems and value of the substantive canons.262 I will
focus here upon the one application of a substantive canon that really aims to address a nondelegation
problem, application of the avoidance canon to avoid adjudicating a nondelegation claim. It turns out
that this particular application involves unusual constitutional problems not fully appreciated in the
relevant literature.263

II. May Judges and Administrative Agencies Constitutionally Construe Statutes to Avoid a
Nondelegation Problem?
Allowing either an agency or a court to construe a statute that creates grave constitutional
doubts under the nondelegation doctrine creates a serious constitutional problem. Grave doubt about
the constitutionality of the statute under the nondelegation doctrine should create grave doubt about the
authority of courts and administrative agencies to interpret a statute to avoid nondelegation defects.264
This section will explain why the American Trucking Court correctly disapproved of the D.C.
See e.g. Eskridge, supra note 216; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20; John Copeland
Nagle, Delaware and Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495 (1997); Lisa A.
Kloppenberg, supra note 99; Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT . REV. 71;
Kloppenberg, supra note 116; Murchison, supra note 116; Schacter, supra note 198; Symposium, A
Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND . L. REV. 529 (1992); Frederic
Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 231; Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 32 WM . & MARY L. REV. 827 (1991); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 29;
Krent, supra note 203; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND . L. REV. 395 (1950).
262

Cf. Manning, supra note 6, at 228 (noting conflict between democratic theory supporting
the nondelegation doctrine and rewriting of a statute).
263

See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-43 (1825) (suggesting that Congress
may not delegate exclusively legislative authority to the judiciary).
264
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Circuit’s practice of ordering administrative agencies to cure nondelegation defects through saving
constructions265, and why this practice is constitutionally suspect. It will then examine whether this
reasoning can be extended to the judiciary. Finally, it will explain why the avoidance canon might be
more problematic in the nondelegation context than in constitutional contexts where it has played a large
role.
A. Agency Authority
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit), the
principle forum for public law litigation under a large number of federal statutes,266 has recently taken to
heart the suggestion in footnote 7 of Mistretta that the principle application of the nondelegation
doctrine may lie in construing statutes to avoid adjudication of nondelegation claims,267 and added an
interesting wrinkle. Confronting a nondelegation claim, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded a rule
protecting workers from accidents by requiring that hazardous equipment be “locked down” or “tagged
out” while not in use with a demand that the Occupational Health and Safety Administration interpret

265

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 471.

See Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 324 (2001) (characterizing the D.C. Circuit as “the most important court in
regulatory law”). See e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7507(b)(1) (requiring judicial review of rules having national
impact in the D.C. Circuit).
266

267

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n.7 (1988) (citing Indus. Union Dep’t. v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974)).
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the Occupational Health and Safety Act268 to avoid a nondelegation claim.269 This approach combines
the avoidance canon with the rule in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council270 committing
resolution of statutory ambiguity to agencies in the first instance.271
The D.C. Circuit applied a similar approach to the Clean Air Act272 in American Trucking
Ass’ns v. Browner.273 The Court misread the nondelegation doctrine as requiring a determinate
criterion in authorizing legislation274 and held that the Act’s requirement that EPA write national ambient
air quality standards protecting the public health with an adequate margin of safety,275 at least as
construed by EPA, violated the nondelegation doctrine.276 Rather than strike down the statute,
however, it remanded the rule before it to the agency, directing EPA to impose a narrowing

268

29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678.

269

See International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

270

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

271

See generally International Union, 938 F.2d at 1321 (remanding to the agency).

272

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671.

273

175 F. 3rd 1027.

Id. at 1034. Cf. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475 (rejecting the D. C. Circuit’s
determinate criterion requirement).
274

275

See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).

See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. The Supreme Court characterized the Court of
Appeals holding as a finding that “EPA’s interpretation (but not that of the statute itself) violated the
nondelegation doctrine.” American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472. This characterization seems charitable,
for the Court of Appeals stated that “EPA appears to have articulated no ‘intelligible principle’ to
channel its application of . . . statutory factors; nor is one apparent from the statute.” American
Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1034. [emphasis added]. The italicized part of the sentence suggests that the
statute itself, not just the EPA interpretation, failed the nondelegation test.
276
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construction upon the relevant provision of the Clean Air Act.277
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in American Trucking, rejected the D.C. Circuit’s practice
of remanding rules to agencies with instructions to narrowly construe legislation creating nondelegation
problems. He explained:
We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute. . . The idea that an agency can
cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that
power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to
exercise - that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted- would itself
be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. [emphasis in original]278
This statement explained why the D.C. Circuit was incorrect to evaluate EPA’s interpretation of the
Clean Air Act, rather than the statute itself, for conformity with the nondelegation doctrine.279 But the
rejection of the relevance of agency construction as a general matter to the constitutional question also
shows that a remand for purposes of construing a statute to avoid a nondelegation defect would be
pointless and therefore inappropriate. This part will explain why the Court is generally correct to take
this position.
Justice Scalia did not explain why agency construction of a statute should be viewed as “an
exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.”280 The answer must be that the rule against delegating
legislative authority generally makes rules issued under statutes not containing an intelligible principle
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American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1038-40.

278

American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-73.

279

See id.

280

See id. at 473.
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invalid. Schechter and Panama Refining both confirm this, for they invalidated implementing
regulations issued under statutes giving the President legislative authority.281
These decisions, however, do not fully explain why the conclusion that a statute violates the
nondelegation doctrine justifies the invalidation of an implementing regulation. Both Panama Refining
and Shechter contain valuable clues; they strongly suggest that executive branch action under a statute
violating the nondelegation doctrine is ultra vires.282 The Panama Refining Court states that regulations
are “valid only as subordinate rules and when found to be within the framework of the policy which the
legislature has sufficiently defined.”283 It then states that due process of law requires that punishment
for violations of “a legislative order of an executive office” only take place when “the order is within the
authority of the officer.”284 Neither these decisions nor American Trucking, however, explain why
regulations under a statute lacking an intelligible principle are ultra vires.285 The reason is, however,

See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-527, 551 (1935)
(invalidating code provisions enacted through executive order under the NIRA); Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405-410, 433 (1935) (invalidating code provisions enacted through executive
order and accompanying implementing regulations).
281

See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542 (objecting to “unfettered” Presidential authority to prescribe
codes of fair competition); Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 429, 432.
Schechter is much less explicit than Panama Refining about why executive action pursuant to
a statute violating the nondelegation doctrine is invalid. But the Schechter Court does object to
“unfettered” Presidential authority to prescribe codes of competition. 295 U.S. at 542. This suggests
that executive action without some fetters, i.e. some prior policy decision by Congress, is ultra vires.
282

283

293 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added).

Id. at 432. The Panama Refining Court also relied on the lack of factual findings
supporting the relevant executive order. Id. at 432-33.
284

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-473; Schechter, 295 U.S. 495; Panama Refining,
293 U.S. 388.
285
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plain enough.
If Congress fails to legislate while conferring authority upon the President or an administrative
agency, rulemaking pursuant to the unconstitutional legislation involves an exercise of legislative authority.
No policy exists in the statute, so the executive branch cannot be implementing a Congressional policy
when it writes rules under such a statute. Rulemaking under a statute lacking an intelligible principle
differs little from writing a law without any statute having been written at all to authorize it.286 In this
situation, the executive branch makes all (not just some) of the relevant and constitutionally permissible
policy decisions itself, just as Congress would if it legislated.
The executive branch may only write a law without properly delegated authority if the
constitution authorizes executive branch legislation.287 If an agency may not constitutionally exercise
legislative authority on its own, doing so is ultra vires and invalid. Article II, section 3 of the Constitution
authorizes the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”288 This authorizes the
President, and by extension the rest of the executive branch, to execute delegated authority, not to write
laws with no policy guidance at all from Congress.289 Hence, writing rules without legislative policy

Cf. Merrill, supra note 99, at 22 (neither the federal judiciary nor an administrative agency
may make law on its own initiative absent a delegation from Congress).
286

Cf. Miller v. AT & T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 843 (4th Cir. 2001) (Hilton, J., dissenting) (“. .
.[A]gency officials do not have the constitutional right . . . to make law.”).
287

288

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.

See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (“Congress may delegate no more
than the authority to make policies and rules that implement its statutes.”); Skinner v. Mid-America
Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212, 220-21 (1988) (discussing authority Congress may delegate, consistent with
the nondelegation doctrine “in order that the President may `take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.’”).
289
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guidance is ultra vires, because article II does not generally authorize Presidential legislation.290
In areas where the entity exercising delegated authority has independent authority over the
subject matter, rulemaking pursuant to a statute lacking an intelligible principle does not violate the
nondelegation doctrine.291 The Court has made this fairly explicit in cases involving “delegation” of
authority to Indian tribes, to states, and to voters.292 This principle can apply to executive branch
lawmaking in areas where the President has plenary authority under the Constitution irrespective of
legislation, for example, the Presidential authority to act as commander-in-chief.293 But the general rule
remains that the executive branch may not write laws, except under an enacted law providing at least
some policy guidance.294
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See U.S. CONST. art II.

See Loving, 517 U.S. at 772-773 (nondelegation doctrine may not apply fully to rulemaking
regarding military discipline because of President’s authority as commander-in-chief); United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-557 (1975) (nondelegation doctrine does not apply fully to delegation to
an Indian Tribe).
291

See e.g. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 556-57 (Indian tribes); United States v. Sharpnack, 355
U.S. 286 (1958) (upholding a statute that allows States to dictate what constitutes a federal crime);
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 427 U.S. 668, 677-798 (1976) (upholding a city charter provision
requiring voter ratification of land use changes, because the people exercised power reserved to
themselves).
292

See Loving, 517 U.S. at 772-773. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (discussing the scope of Presidential law-making authority).
293

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 473 (agency choice of a standard would constitute “an
exercise of forbidden legislative authority.”); Loving, 517 U.S. at 771-773 (suggesting that delegated
power to interpret legislation is needed in areas where the executive has no inherent authority); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-694 (1892) (approving exercise of authority to apply law to facts as legal
execution, rather than legislation); Bressman, supra note 3, at 474 (“In the absence of a constitutional
transfer of authority, the agency simply possesses no authority at all.”).
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It follows that an agency interpreting a statute with a nondelegation defect to make it more
specific acts unconstitutionally as well.295 This implies that grave doubt about the constitutionality of a
statute under the nondelegation doctrine introduces grave doubt about the constitutionality of an agency
construction of the statute clarifying the statute.
For example, imagine that Congress enacts a statute requiring EPA to make “good
environmental policy.”296 A court reviewing an agency rule under this statute limiting an air pollutant to 5
parts per million in the atmosphere concludes that this very general statute gives rise to grave
constitutional doubts under the nondelegation doctrine.297 It directs the agency on remand to interpret
the statute to make the policy more specific. On remand, the agency must decide whether good
environmental policy means health protective policy, policy that balances costs and benefits, or
something else. This very general interpretive decision involves an exercise of legislative judgment
without adequate Congressional guidance. Hence, the decision, no matter how wise and specific, is
constitutionally suspect, because the legislative guidance behind it was so vague as to raise a serious
nondelegation issue.
Indeed, the agency’s general decision about the meaning of the statute is, in some respects, more

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 473 (agency “perscription of the standard that
Congress had omitted . . . would itself be an exercise of forbidden legislative power”) (italics in
original) .
295

Cf. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 339 (suggesting that a statute authorizing the President to
“enact such environmental regulations as he deemed best” would offend the nondelegation doctrine).
296

297

Given the breadth of permissible delegations under the nondelegation doctrine, this statute
may not raise a grave issue under the doctrine. I ask the reader to assume that it does for purposes of
this discussion and further discussion of this hypothetical in the article.
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“legislative” than the decision to write the 5 parts per million standard. The agency’s interpretation is
general, and like legislation, guides a host of future agency actions. The decision to write the 5 parts per
million standard only governs the particular pollutant at issue. On the other hand, the 5 parts per million
standard presumably binds those who must implement the standard, while an agency generally may
change its interpretation of its own legislation with an adequate explanation.298 But the main point is
simple, both rulemaking under a defective mandate and interpretation curing the defect are
constitutionally suspect under the nondelegation doctrine.299
Nevertheless, the American Trucking Court’s disapproval of agency construction of a statute
to avoid a nondelegation difficulty stands in some tension with the Court’s prior practice of considering
administrative practice when deciding whether a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine. Scalia
addresses this problem, stating that, “We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful
delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute.”300
While this is literally true, it would be hard to reconcile disapproval of agency construction with a general
rule that such agency construction of an otherwise invalid statute generally saves it from an unfavorable
nondelegation ruling. Such a general rule would amount to giving controlling weight to unconstitutional
decisions by administrative agencies.
It is not clear, however, that such a general rule of giving weight to an agency construction in this
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1983)
(agency may reverse its previous decision if it provides a reasoned explanation for the change).
298

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-73; Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 551 (1934) (striking down regulations because issued pursuant to an invalid delegation).
299

300

American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472.
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context exists. The Court has not always explicitly explained why and how administrative practice
effects nondelegation analysis. Scalia’s American Trucking opinion distinguishes the leading cases in
which administrative construction has played a role.301 In doing so, the Court provides a basis for
reconciling a practice of sometimes considering agency interpretation germane to the question of whether
a nondelegation defect exists, while still recognizing the lack of a satisfactory constitutional basis for
construing an otherwise unintelligible mandate.
Scalia points out that the Court in Lichter v. United States302 took agency regulations into
account because Congress subsequently incorporated the agency regulations before the Court into the
statute.303 Lichter thus demonstrates that administrative practice may help a court assess the
acceptability of a statutory mandate under the nondelegation doctrine for reasons independent of the
mere existence of a narrowing administrative interpretation. Thus, reliance upon an unconstitutional
interpretation by an agency did not influence the result in Lichter, rather the decision by Congress to
incorporate the agency interpretation influenced the result.304
If Congress did intend to adopt an administrative interpretation clarifying a statute’s meaning,
then the Court should consider that interpretation in ruling on a nondelegation objection. Otherwise, the
Court will invalidate legislation that in fact provides perfectly intelligible guidance to the delegate because
of a shared understanding of terms that might seem utterly vapid to a reviewing court if taken out of

301

Id.

302

334 U.S. 742, 783 (1948).

303

American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472.

304

Id.
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context. Using administrative interpretation as a tool to understand actual legislative intent, however, is
very different from allowing an agency to cure a statute lacking any intelligible principle upon which one
might base an interpretation through post-enactment “construction” that Congress did not intend to
adopt.
If the Court automatically assumed that Congress intends to adopt every agency construction,
then the distinction between reliance upon an unconstitutional administrative agency interpretation and
Congressional adoption of an agency interpretation would vanish. Lichter, however, held that the
particular administrative interpretation before it revealed Congressional intent, because Congress was
aware of the interpretation, acquiesced in it, and then adopted it explicitly in a statutory amendment.305
The Court often presumes that Congress intends to adopt a pre-existing administrative interpretation
when it re-enacts a statute without change.306 This presumption, however, does not establish a per se
rule that Congress always intends to incorporate administrative interpretation, because the rule does not
apply if no reenactment takes place and because the presumption can sometimes be overcome.307
Indeed, the Court has sometimes rejected the assumption that Congress intended to adopt a prior
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Lichter, 334 U.S. at 783.

306

Lorillard v. Pons, 575 U.S. 575, 580 (1978).

See e.g. FDA v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp. 529 U.S. 120, 131-33 (2000)
(holding that Congress did not acquiesce in agency construction of authority to regulate a “medical
device” as including cigarette regulation); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC)
v. Army Corp of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 168-170 (2001) (declining to acquiesce in an administration
interpretation of the definition of navigable waters under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
despite reenactment of relevant provision).
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agency construction, even in the face of some evidence of acquiescence.308
Scalia also distinguishes, albeit with some difficulty, Fahey v. Mallonee,309 another
nondelegation case that involves agency construction.310 Scalia claims that the Fahey Court mentioned
agency regulations “because the customary practices in the area, implicitly incorporated in the statute,
were reflected in the regulations.”311
Surely, a court should consider Congressional incorporation of customary practice in evaluating
a nondelegation claim, for the same reason that it should consider adopted administrative practice. A
court should not evaluate the intelligibility of a statutory mandate without fully understanding what it
means to implementing officials and Congress. While the Fahey Court did not explicitly say that
Congress had adopted the custom the Court referred to,312 such a conclusion is a plausible inference
from the opaque discussion in Fahey.313
In context, it seems more likely, however, that the Fahey Court intended to suggest that if
administrators and courts had sufficient experience with a problem, then an intelligible legislative policy

See e.g. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168-70 (declining to acquiesce in an administration
interpretation of the definition of navigable waters under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act). Cf.
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300 (1980) (“congressional acquiescence may sometimes be found from
nothing more than silence in the face of an administrative policy.”) [emphasis added].
308

309

332 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1947).

310

See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-73.

311

Id.

See Fahey, 332 U.S. at 251-54 (suggesting that the custom clarifies the statute, but not
expressly claiming that Congress had incorporated the relevant custom).
312

313

See id. at 249-58.
65

may not be necessary. 314 This would suggest that the Fahey Court did not, in fact, rely upon
administrative interpretation to clarify an otherwise impermissibly vague statutory mandate on a
predictable across the board basis. Rather, it relied on administrative experience to suggest that some
pragmatically acceptable substitute for Congressional control of policy is available. If that is what the
Court means, then this part of Fahey has little to teach about the constitutional acceptability of relying on
particular administrative interpretations to clarify an otherwise impermissibly vague mandate.
Scalia did not discuss another prominent nondelegation case in which administrative
interpretation played a role, Yakus v. United States.315 That case, however, does not present any real
difficulty for Scalia’s position. In Yakus, the Court considered a statement accompanying challenged
regulations relevant, because it established a predicate for political and judicial review of the regulations
to ascertain their conformity (or non-conformity) with the underlying statute.316 This use of administrative
practice does not give great weight to the clarity the regulations themselves may add to the statutory
mandate. Rather, it relies on the existence of an explanation as evidence that the underlying statute itself
provides meaningful guidance to the agency and that a check exists to limit the power of the agency
under the statute.317 Yakus is basically irrelevant to the question of whether the Court should allow a

See id. at 250 (citing judicial and administrative experience with banking regulation as a
reason to demand very little specificity under a statute involving federally created banks).
314

315

321 U.S. 414 (1944).

316

Id. at 426.

See id. (because administrative “statement of considerations” enables Congress, the courts,
and the public, has conformed to statutory standards, there is no unauthorized delegation of legislative
power).
317
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regulation clarifying an otherwise unconstitutionally vague statute to help justify the statute.318
While the American Trucking Court clearly rejected remands to agencies for the purpose of
administrative construction, American Trucking might not preclude reliance upon well established prior
administrative construction to save a statute. The formal logic of Scalia’s rationale seems to preclude
this, but the Court still might allow a well established prior gloss on a statute to influence its
nondelegation analysis. The Court sometimes construes a lack of legislative response to statutory
construction as acquiescence, so it can always claim that Congress intended to adopt an administrative
gloss upon the statute.319 That approach can render incorporation of any prior administrative
construction in a nondelegation analysis consistent with Scalia’s statements for the American Trucking
Court. Indeed, even if an agency should seek Congressional clarification, rather than interpret a statute
to “solve” a nondelegation problem when it sees one, it may appropriately interpret a statute for the
simple purpose of deciding how to implement it. Indeed, such interpretation is often unavoidable. Once
established, it would seem unduly formalistic, if not for Scalia, than perhaps for much of the rest of the
Court, to ignore it.
In sum, the precedent giving weight to administrative practice in nondelegation cases does not
squarely conflict with the suggestion that construction of an unintelligible statute to solve a nondelegation
problem is constitutionally suspect. While a court decision ordering an agency to prospectively choose
a new policy where no policy exists in the underlying legislation is problematic, recognizing that past
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See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).

See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 300 (1980) (“congressional acquiescence may sometimes
be found from nothing more than silence in the face of an administrative policy.”)
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administrative practice may cast light on the content of the legislative mandate or demonstrate that
judicial review will prove effective is legitimate. In such cases, the Court is not using administrative
practice to cure a constitutional defect; instead, the Court uses administrative practice as an interpretive
tool to discern whether the underlying legislation has such a defect.
This discussion establishes several crucial principles. A body that may act only pursuant to
delegated authority may not constitutionally act pursuant to an unintelligible delegation. Therefore, an
arguably unintelligible delegation makes construction of the delegating legislation constitutionally
suspect.320

Professor Bressman resists this conclusion. She claims that the American Trucking Court’s
discussion of administrative construction is dictum. See Bressman, supra note 3, at 473. But the Court
discusses administrative construction in a case where the D.C. Circuit ordered construction of the
statute to avoid the nondelegation problem. Hence, the Court’s unanimous general rejection of
administrative saving construction supports American Trucking’s result as directly as the Court’s
holding that the avoidance canon cannot apply because the statute raises no grave constitutional doubt
on constitutional grounds. When the Court offers two rationales for a decision, either of which is
sufficient to justify reversal, writing one off as dictum is problematic.
Even if Bressman’s characterization of the statement rejecting administrative construction as
dictum were clearly correct, that would not obviate the need to consider that statement carefully.
Lower courts usually follow Supreme Court dicta if possible, and dicta often become holdings in
subsequent cases.
Bressman does not really grapple with the Court’s point that administrative construction as a
cure for serious nondelegation problems conflicts with the legislative supremacy principle at the heart of
the nondelegation doctrine. See id. at 474-78 (arguing that the Court’s statement simply reflects
rejection of administrative usurpation of the Court’s interpretive authority). She simply claims that
“delegations susceptible to narrowing construction are not invalid ab initio.” Id. at 476. But she
makes no attempt to reconcile this statement with Schechter’s rejection of convictions obtained before
the Court held that the National Industrial Recovery Act conflicts with the nondelegation doctrine,
see A.L.A. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 519, 555 (1935), or with American
Trucking’s language, see American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-73 (rejecting saving administrative
construction). In the end, she essentially claims that the Court cannot mean what it said, because its
logic would doom judicial construction to avoid nondelegation claims as well. See Bressman, supra
note 3, at 477. I agree that the Court’s logic does call into question judicial construction, but that calls
320
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B. Judicial Authority
Scalia’s rationale for disapproving of agency saving constructions might apply equally well to
courts.321 The idea that a court can “cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by
declining to exercise some of that power” (or ordering an agency not to), seems as “internally
contradictory” as the notion of agency cure through construction.322 Surely, “the very choice of which
portion of the power to exercise - that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had
omitted- would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.”323 If the nondelegation
doctrine requires at least a general policy choice from Congress, then neither a Court nor agency can
“cure” Congressional failure to make such a choice by making a choice in Congress’ stead.
Judicial saving “construction” not only raises a constitutional issue, it poses even more troubling
problems for democratic theory than administrative saving construction.324 Suppose that a court rather
than an agency interprets the good environmental policy statute, holding that the statute requires

for an assessment of whether judicial construction should be called into question, a problem that the
following pages address. But Bressman’s reading of American Trucking simply refuses to accept that
the Court meant what it said on this issue.
Cf. Bressman, supra note 3, at 477 (noting that if delegations susceptible to narrowing
constructions were “invalid ab initio,” courts could not resuscitate them through statutory construction
either).
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Cf. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 473.
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Cf. id.

See Marshall, supra note 113, at 223-25 (delegation of authority to judiciary is more
problematic than delegation to an agency, because democratic controls do not limit the judiciary as
much); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Inherent Limits on Judicial Control of Agency Discretion: The
D.C. Circuit and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 52 ADMIN . L. REV. 63, 92 (2000) .
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protection of public health. That holding amounts to judicial legislation for all practical purposes. The
protect public health rule reflects the Court’s own policy decision without any meaningful Congressional
guidance, and this rule prospectively binds a host of future actions by the implementing agency.
Democratic constraints do not limit the judiciary’s policy choices, but such constraints might well limit an
administrative agency’s policy choices in making a similar unbounded policy decision.325 Administrative
agencies, unlike the judiciary, face supervision from elected officials, the President of the United States
and Congressional representatives serving on oversight committees.326 From the standpoint of
democratic theory, it would be quite senseless to discourage saving constructions from the agencies,
while encouraging them from courts.327
Like agencies, courts may not exercise legislative authority without some constitutional
justification.328 In most administrative law cases, applicable statutes delegate interpretive authority to the

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865866 (1984) (describing administrative agencies as part of a political branch and indirectly accountable
to the people).
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See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 909-938, 954-57 (1995); Pierce
supra note 324, at 94 (discussing Presidential “arm twisting” and “jawboning.”).
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Richard Pierce has objected to the D.C. Circuit practice of ordering agencies to narrowly
construe their statutory mandates as anti-democratic. See Pierce, supra note 324, at 92-94. He points
out that to the extent a narrowing administrative construction binds future administrations, it limits the
policy discretion of future administrations, and therefore the effects of future Presidential elections. See
id. Even if administrative decisions do bind future presidents, they are less anti-democratic than judicial
constructions. For the judicial constructions not only bind and limit future Presidents but come from the
“least politically accountable officials,” namely judges. See id. at 92 (emphasis in original).
Cf Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 883, 893 n. 46 (there must always be statutory or constitutional authority for any federal
common law rule).
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judiciary.329 If a statute itself does not properly delegate the needed authority to the judiciary, because it
lacks an intelligible principle, then the statute’s existence may not justify judicial construction. A lack of
an intelligible principle might suggest that there is “no law to apply” in resolving a case.330 Traditionally,
the courts have declined to review agency action where no law applies, suggesting doubt about judicial
authority to second guess agency decision-making where no intelligible principle exists.331
In other words, if Congress may not delegate legislative authority, Congress may not delegate
legislative authority to courts. And to throw a question to the courts without the benefit of an
announcement of at least a general policy seems just as suspect as to delegate quasi-legislative
rulemaking authority to an agency with no guidance.
To the extent federal judicial authority to craft a policy emanates from a statute,332 judicial
construction of a statute that arguably lacks an intelligible principle is at least as constitutionally suspect
as administrative construction. In light of the line of cases approving delegations to entities that have
independent authority to address the matter at hand without strict application of the intelligible principle
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See e.g. 5 U.S.C. § 706; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b).

See generally, Zellmer, supra note 9, at 989-991 (suggesting that a situation where no law
applies might create a serious nondelegation issue). Cf. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman,
Congress, the Supreme Court, and The Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L. J.
819, 874 (calling for repeal of the Administrative Procedure Act provision prohibiting judicial review
where no law applies); Kenneth Culp Davis, No Law to Apply, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4-10 (1988)
(recommending judicial review even without law to apply).
330
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See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-31 (1985).

See e.g. Texas Ind., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (power to
write common law rule emanates from statute); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966) (declining to craft federal common law rule governing federal mineral leases, because the Court
found no threat to a discernable federal policy or interest).
332
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requirement,333 one must inquire into the scope of federal court’s independent authority to make law.
Just as American Trucking’s rejection of administrative saving construction should not apply in areas
where independent executive branch lawmaking authority exists under the constitution, so too rejection
of judicial saving constructions should not apply to areas where federal courts have lawmaking power
independent of any Congressional authorization.
Under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, however, the federal courts enjoy no general lawmaking
authority.334 The Erie Court held that state law, rather than federal common law, should define the
scope of a railroad’s liability for accidents occurring along its right of way.335 In doing so, it rejected the
general authority of federal courts to develop rules of decision. The rationale for this rejection reflected
a combination of both statutory and constitutional restraints upon the independent law-making authority
of federal courts.336 The Erie Court overruled a prior decision, Swift v. Tyson,337 construing the
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 to authorize federal courts to decide “what the common law of the State

See e.g. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1996) (nondelegation
doctrine may not apply fully to rulemaking regarding military discipline because of President’s authority
as commander-in-chief); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-557 (1975) (nondelegation
doctrine does not apply fully to delegation to an Indian Tribe).
333

334

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937) (“There is no general federal common
law.”); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (federal courts “do not possess a general
power to develop and apply their own rules of decision”).
335

Erie, 304 U.S. at 69, 80.

See Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-80 (discussing the reasons behind the Court’s denial of a federal
common law).
336

337

16 Pet. 1 (1842).
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is or should be.”338 Swift interpreted a statutory requirement that federal courts must generally apply the
“laws of the several States” to exclude any federal judicial obligation to follow state supreme court
decisions announcing common law rules,339 thus allowing federal courts to choose the common law rules
that would apply in diversity suits. Swift’s view that state supreme court decisions were not state laws
made sense in an era when the common law was viewed as a “transcendental body of law” that courts
discovered rather than created.340 Under this view, state court decisions, while evidence of the content
of the law, were not themselves law.341 But once the Supreme Court perceived that federal selection of
common law rules reflected judicial policy judgments (in keeping with legal realism), it decided that
federal courts ought not exercise the general lawmaking power approved in Swift.342 Erie’s rejection of
judicial policy-making also rested in part upon constitutional grounds, creating a rule that the federal
courts lack general lawmaking power.343
Exceptions to the general principle that federal courts lack legislative authority exist.344 But the
338

Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-80.
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Id. at 71.
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See id. at 79.

341

See id. at 79.
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See id.
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See id. at 77-78 (the unconstitutionality of the “course pursued” compels reversal of Swift).

See e.g. Hinterlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)
(holding on the day Erie issued that federal common law governs apportionment of water from an
interstate stream). See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-422 (1964) (noting and defending the existence of some
federal common law); Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM .
L. REV. 489 (1954); Alfred Hill, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional
344
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Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the courts may only craft federal rules of decision in a few
narrowly circumscribed areas.345 These exceptions probably do not reach many things of importance,
such as the power to establish public law standards to govern administrative agencies.
For example, a court probably does not have the authority to write legislative instructions to
EPA about how to write pollution control standards without any delegated authority to do so. The
Court has certainly never suggested that the limited exceptions to the rule that federal courts may not
legislate embrace such a sweeping power.346 If the courts would not have this authority to create a
legislative program for a federal agency without an authorizing statute, then its authority to write

Preemption, 67 COLUM . L. REV. 1024 (1967); Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of Federal Law”:
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PENN.
L. REV. 797 (1957); Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969); Note, The
Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084 (1964);
Note, Federal Common Law and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YALE L. J.
325 (1964); Comment, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 YALE L. J. 1428 (1960); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327 (1992); Martin H. Redish, Federal
Common Law, Political Legitimacy and the Interpretive Process: An Institutionalist
Perspective, 83 NW . U. L. REV. 761 (1989); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW . U.
L. REV. 805 (1989); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: A
Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 NW . U. L. REV. 853 (1989); Louise Weinberg, The Curious
Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 NW U. L. REV.
860 (1989).
See Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc. 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (federal common
law applies only in “some limited areas.”); Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504
(1988) (federal common law exists in a “few areas, involving `uniquely federal interests.’”) (citations
omitted); Wheedin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (areas of federal common law are “few and
restricted”).
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Cf. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS 2d §§
4514-19 (listing cases). I cannot offer a full theoretical proof that the constitution bars the creation of
such an authority here, because doing so would require the development and defense of an entire
theory of the scope of federal common law.
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standards governing agency action relies upon delegated authority.347 If that is the case, then exercise of
that authority in the face of a serious nondelegation challenge seems suspect indeed.348
Even when a statute contains a general policy clearly satisfying the nondelegation doctrine, recent
Supreme Court cases express skepticism about the constitutional authority of courts to create legal rules
filling in the interstices of very broad statutes. In a number of cases, the Court has turned to state law to
fill in these interstices, on the grounds that judges should not make law without adequate Congressional
guidance.
For example, in O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,349 the Court declined to fashion a federal
common law rule that would affect the Federal Deposit Insurance Company’s (FDIC’s) ability to
recover damages against a law firm that had represented a failed federally insured savings and loan
association (S & L).350 The Court bottomed its refusal on separation of powers grounds (like those that
give rise to the nondelegation doctrine).351 It explained that a decision affecting the tort liability of
lawyers and accountants representing S & Ls would require weighing and appraisal of a host of
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Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (characterizing the
nondelegation doctrine has precluding any Congressional delegation of legislative power, not just a
delegation to an agency); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771, 776-77 (1996); J.W. Hampton,
Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263,
290 (1992) (arguing that federal common law must further “ascertainable statutory purposes”).
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512 U.S. 79 (1994).
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See id. at 80-81, 89.

See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
PA . L. REV. 1245, 1367 (1996). See generally Weiser, supra note 222 at 1704 (noting the role
separation of powers has played in increasing judicial reluctance to create federal common law).
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competing policy considerations.352 That weighing and appraising, said the Court, is more appropriate
for “those who write the laws” than for “those who interpret them.”353 It thus suggested that no federal
common law rulemaking was appropriate, because Congress should make the relevant policy choice.354
Recently, the Court has emphasized the need for some Congressional policy as a prerequisite to
federal judicial use of common law authority. For example, in Atherton v. FDIC,355 the Court rejected
the applicability of federal common law standards establishing the duty of care officers and directors
owe to federally chartered and insured banks.356 The Court emphasized that a conflict between a
federal policy or interest and a state law is normally a precondition for the application of federal common
law to a problem. 357
If a statute contains no federal policy, then a Court cannot find a conflict between a federal
policy or interest and a state law to justify creation of a federal rule of decision. Indeed, the Atherton
Court declined to create a federal common law rule notwithstanding a federal statute expressing the
general policy of assuring the solvency of federally chartered and insured institutions and a specific policy
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O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 89.

353

Id.

Cf. Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U.L.REV. 895, 901, 920-954
(1996) (arguing that a Court should have crafted a federal rule to serve identifiable federal policy
interests).
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519 U.S. 213 (1997).
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Id. at 215-18.

357

Id. at 218.
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regarding a duty of care.358
Courts do have the authority to fashion common law rules addressing unanswered policy issues
in federal statutes that contain an intelligible principle.359 But the Court’s expressions of doubt about the
appropriateness of judicial creation of policy, even in cases where some intelligible principle exists,
suggest a grave constitutional doubt about judicial authority to write federal rules where a statute
provides no intelligible principle.
Readers should not confuse a want of intelligible principle with the mere existence of some
ambiguity in a statute.360 Every statute, no matter how specific, will provide ambiguous guidance as to
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The Court suggested that the federal interest in promoting the fiscal soundness of banks it
chartered and insured should not count as a ground for creating a federal common law rule on formalist
grounds. Specifically, since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation acted as a “receiver of a failed
institution,” the Court assumed that it “is not pursuing the interest of the Federal Government as a bank
insurer.” Id. at 225. It did not explain why it believed that the use of a federal receiver was unrelated
to the federal interest in making banks fiscally sound or conserving insurance proceeds. Nor did it
explain why the limits of the particular interest a litigating agency had in a given case should limit the
federal policies that a Court should consider relevant to deciding whether to create a federal rule of
decision.
The Court divorced its decision about creation of a federal law rule from its consideration of the
specific statutory provisions creating a standard of care for such cases. It held that the statutory
language created a gross negligence standard as a minimum floor governing the standards of directors.
Id. at 226-27. It held that stricter state law would continue to apply as well. Id. at 227-231. The
holding that no federal common law applied had the effect, in this context, of buttressing the conclusion
that state laws establishing stricter standards of care continued to apply. See id. at 230-31.
See generally Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the “New Erie” Canal,
1990 UTAH L. REV. 759, 803 (claiming that cases creating federal law involve a relevant federal
statute).
359

See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 361 (statutory ambiguity does not imply unconstitutionality
under the nondelegation doctrine). See generally Lund, supra note 354, at 1010 (distinguishing
between making policy and “making federal rules to effectuate” Congressional “policy decisions”).
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some subsidiary issue.361 But that’s very different from lacking any intelligible policy at all.
If a statute announces some policy, courts have the authority to interpret or add to a statute,
even if the policy is too general to dictate a resolution of the issue before the Court.362 This principle
accounts for some of the most expansive and troubling exercises of federal judicial lawmaking authority.
For example, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,363 a very controversial decision among constitutional
scholars,364 the Supreme Court reversed a decision not to specifically enforce an obligation to arbitrate
disputes under a collective bargaining agreement.365 Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947,366 under which the Court acted, provided no rules to govern enforcement of these
agreements, as the dissent pointed out.367 The Court, however, provided a rule of specific enforcement,
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See Lund, supra note 354, at 1011, Merrill, supra note 344, at 353.

See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (federal
courts have authority to require agencies to follow specific Congressional intent and to overrule
unreasonable agency constructions of ambiguous legislation). See e.g. Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755 (1998) (decision about employer liability under Title VI for a supervisor’s
creation of a hostile work environment involves interpretation rather than federal common law); United
States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (declining to displace state law governing parent
corporation liability under CERCLA because the statute does not address parent liability).
362
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353 U.S. 448 (1956).

Compare Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the
Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957) with Note, The Federal
Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1531-35 (1969).
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353 U.S. 448 (1956).
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(Taft-Hartley Act), § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
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See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 460-61 (Frankfurter J., dissenting).
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notwithstanding the statutory silence as to remedies.368 The Court identified an intelligible principle in the
statute to guide the creation of federal common law on collective bargaining, specifically the principle of
encouraging collective bargaining as a means of providing for labor peace.369 That general principle led
the Court to adopt a rule specifically enforcing arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements.370
Subsequent cases developing this body of law contain common law reasoning based on general
principles found in the statute.371 Not surprisingly, a long line of cases allow the judiciary to make policy
judgments in interpreting ambiguous statutes and even in creating common law rules to effectuate their
purposes.372 But the courts deciding these cases rely, at least implicitly, upon delegated authority from
Congress.373
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Id. at 455-56.

369

Id. at 454-56.

370

Id. at 456.

See e.g. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (requiring
arbitration of a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement before a court could rule on the
validity of a grievance); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)
(subjecting a dispute over contracting out to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement,
notwithstanding a management rights clause in the agreement); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (enforcing arbitral award after expiration of the underlying
collective bargaining agreement).
371

See e.g. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (creating standards for
employer liability under Title VI for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor); Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983) (federal court creates a statute of limitations for claims under a collective bargaining agreement).
Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REV. 303, 317 (1992) (“the
whole purpose of federal common law is to effectuate” Congressional policies).
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See generally Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the New Erie Canal, 1990
UTAH L. REV. 759, 761 (federal common law does not offend separation of powers if constrained by
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I do not mean to suggest that no federal judicial common lawmaking authority exists without a
statutory policy. The Court’s holdings regarding admiralty,374 interstate pollution,375 and the act of state
doctrine376 pursue policies not derived from any statute. But the Court’s powers to write law with no
statutory predicate at all are even more limited than the power to write rules of decision to advance
statutory purposes. And there’s no reason to expect independent judicial legislative authority to prove
relevant more often than independent executive branch legislative authority, which does exist in limited
areas as well.
I would expect some federal courts scholars to argue that even without a statutory policy, courts
have inherent authority to interpret a statute, including the authority to narrow it to avoid a nondelegation

expressions of policy in positive law). This does not necessarily mean that the delegation must be
explicit. Compare Milwaukee v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (majority finds no federal common law
because Congress did not explicitly mandate its creation) with United States v. Little Lake Misere
Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) (rejecting argument that state law applies absent specific contrary
statutory directive); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 357-76 (1983) (rejecting requirement for specific
Congressional authorization of federal common law). Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S.
500 (1988) (no specific command to create federal common law required when federal preemption
applies). Even if Courts have inherent authority to write rules to elaborate or interpret a federal statute,
they may have no inherent authority to write federal law on their own without a federal statute in many
areas.
See e.g. American Ins. Co. v. Canter 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828) (courts apply
admiralty law as cases arise); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917) (expansively
interpreting lawmaking authority of federal courts in admiralty).
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See e.g. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (adjudicating a dispute over discharge of
sewage into interstate rivers under federal common law).
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See e.g. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (act of state doctrine
precludes a claim based upon invalidity of Cuban expropriation).
376

80

claim.377 If such an authority exists, it must come from the Article III authority to decide cases arising
under federal law.378 While this is plausible, an equally plausible rationale exists for rejecting the Court’s
statement that agencies cannot cure nondelegation defects. One might posit that the authority to
“execute” the laws, an authority that the President, and by extension, an administrative agency clearly has
under article II of the constitution, authorizes interpretation of statutes. It does not seem plausible,
however, to reject inherent agency authority to interpret a statute, as the American Trucking Court
does with respect to agency saving constructions in the face of a nondelegation claim, but to accept
judicial authority to do so (except in cases where a more specific source of constitutional authority is
available for either the agency or the court). After all, agencies must interpret statutes to implement them
just as courts must interpret them in order to review their application.
Finally, nothing in American Trucking casts serious doubt upon the extension of its rationale to
judicial saving construction under the avoidance canon. The Court specifically declined to apply the
avoidance canon to the question of whether cost should be considered in writing national ambient air
quality standards under the Clean Air Act; indeed, it reached and rejected the nondelegation claim. 379
Hence, the case does not address the problem of a judge saving a statute from a possible ruling on a
nondelegation issue through extraordinary construction.
American Trucking does, however, illustrate an important caveat. Judicial and administrative
See generally Jonothan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A
Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW . U.
L. REV. ___ (2002).
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U.S. Const. Art. III, sec. 2.
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See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-76.
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construction must continue to play a role in nondelegation cases, not in saving statutes through narrowing
construction, but simply in trying to understand what they mean. In the paragraph immediately following
the Court’s rejection of agency saving construction, the Court accepted a construction of the Clean Air
Act offered by the Solicitor General. 380 That construction read the requirement that EPA establish
standards “requisite” to protect the public health as requiring standards “sufficient, but not more than
necessary.”381 The Court did not indicate that it adopted this reading as a saving construction facilitating
the avoidance of the nondelegation issue. Nor did the Court indicate that this construction was essential
to eliminating any grave doubt about the statute’s constitutionality, finding “the scope of discretion
109(b)(1) allows . . . well within the outer limits” of the Court’s “nondelegation precedent.”382 But the
Court found it helpful, as one might expect, to understand the text’s meaning as a prelude to evaluating it
under the nondelegation doctrine.383 For those purposes, administrative and judicial construction should
continue to play a role.
Furthermore, the Court’s statement reserving to itself the question of whether a statute delegates
legislative authority384 does not embrace judicial saving construction. Because a determination that a
statute delegates legislative authority requires a holding of unconstitutionality, this statement reserves to
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Id. at 473.

381

Id.

382

See id. at 474.

See id. at 473 (addressing the question of the Act’s interpretation first because “the first step
in assessing whether a statute delegates legislative power is to determine what authority the statute
confers”).
383

384

Id. at 473.
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the Court adjudication of the constitutional issue, but does not address the question of whether a Court
should construe a statute to avoid, rather than resolve, a nondelegation issue.
Grave doubts about the constitutionality of legislation under the nondelegation doctrine generally
create grave doubts about the constitutionality of constructions narrowing an unintelligible underlying
mandate.385 This seems as true of judicial as of administrative construction.

C. Why Application of the Avoidance Canon Poses Unique Problems in the
Nondelegation Context.
This problem of doubts about the constitutionality of a statute creating doubts about the
constitutional authority to construe a statute to avoid a constitutional issue does not arise under most
other applications of the avoidance canon, because most constitutional doctrines that trigger the
avoidance canon do not really raise questions about the delegation of interpretive authority to the Court.
They typically call into question a particular statutory application, not the entire statute (or even an entire
statutory provision).386 Furthermore, the constitutional doctrine triggering avoidance tends to enhance
the legitimacy of saving judicial construction outside of the nondelegation context, by providing a
constitutional basis for the substantive direction of construction. Construing a statute to avoid a
nondelegation issue requires constitutionally suspect judicial policy-making without statutory guidance, in
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Some exceptions may exist to this rule in areas where the courts have truly independent
authority to write law. See generally Clark, supra note 351, at 1270-71 (agreeing with general
principle of no federal common law, but arguing that constitutional structure supports exceptions to this
principle in some areas).
Cf. Aranson et al., supra note 10, at 16-17 (pointing out that procedural due process, equal
protection, and free speech doctrines do not “void entire regulatory schemes.”)
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great tension with the legislative supremacy principle that motivates the nondelegation doctrine.
NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago387 illustrates the point that avoidance outside of the
nondelegation context does not call into question the Court’s overall authority to interpret a statute. That
case raised the question of whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)388 applies to a parochial
school.389 The Court held that it did not.390 The Court interpreted the legislation narrowly, because it
feared that the statute, by requiring federal supervision of collective bargaining between teachers and the
Church, would otherwise pose a difficult free exercise issue.391 The NLRA was constitutional in
general.392 The Court had general authority to interpret the statute.393 And Congress had made a
general policy decision, namely that employers (with some exceptions set out in the act) would have to
bargain in good faith with unions representing employees.394 The Court’s narrow interpretation simply
cut off a possibly unconstitutional (in the Court’s view) application of the statute, leaving the rest
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440 U.S. 490 (1979).
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29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
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NLRB, 440 U.S. at 507.
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Id.
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Id. at 506-07.

See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding statute under
commerce clause).
392

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (it is the judiciary’s province
to say what the law is).
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See NLRB, 440 U.S. at 493-94 (case arises out of failure of the religious schools to
recognize and bargain with the union representing its employees).
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intact.395
Commentators have sharply attacked this particular application of the avoidance canon, because
it seemed to ignore the rule that a saving construction must be plausible.396 After all, the NLRA applied
by its terms to all “employees,” with some exceptions not relevant in this case.397 As the dissent pointed
out, the Court did not explain why religious school teachers were not employees of the employing
religious school.398 The argument that the construction is wrong, however, does not suggest that the
Court lacked authority to construe the statute and legislated when it did so.399 Rather, the Court made a
particular narrow decision about the statute’s application that it clearly had authority to make, but did so
badly. A ruling that upheld NLRB jurisdiction over religious school teachers would satisfy the concerns
of this case’s critics. This means that criticism of this application of the avoidance canon does not
involve questioning the Court’s general authority to interpret the statute. Rather, the commentators call
into question the particular construction the Court chose.
The NLRB case also shows how, outside of the nondelegation context, the constitutional
motivation for the substance of the construction can enhance the construction’s legitimacy. The NLRB
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See e.g. Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 216, at 1066.
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See NLRB, 440 U.S. at 511 (Brennan J., dissenting); 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)..
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NLRB, 440 U.S. at 517 (Court does not provide evidence that Congress intended religious
school teachers to be exempt from definition of employee).
See Kramer, supra note 348, at 289, 300 n. 116 (distinguishing between arguments about
the wisdom of a judicial decision’s substance from questions about the legitimacy of the federal court’s
deciding an issue).
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Court construed this statute to avoid a serious constitutional problem, interference with freedom of
religion.400 Thus, the Court’s decision, to the extent the constitutional analysis is at all plausible, derives
some legitimacy from the constitutional values it serves.
Avoiding a nondelegation issue through statutory construction creates a serious legitimacy
problem. Such constructions always take place where grave doubt exists about the very existence of
any legislative policy decision. And doubt exists about the constitutionality of any construction of the
statute for the sake of avoiding a nondelegation claim, because, absent some prior Congressional policy
decision, the interpretation becomes a forbidden legislative act. Put another way, in many contexts the
avoidance canon has some countermajoritarian constitutional basis for its countermajoritarian tendencies.
But in the nondelegation context, the Court’s construction undercuts the very majoritarian values the
construction aims to serve.401
Furthermore, construction to avoid a nondelegation problem will tend to prove more
unprincipled than constructions serving substantive constitutional values. The arguments thus far have
primarily been formalist in nature, in keeping with the general tenor of recent Supreme Court
decisions.402 Judicial construction of statutes to avoid nondelegation claims, however, produces
400

See NLRB, 440 U.S. at 507.
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Accord Manning, supra note 6, at 228.

See Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law:
Constitutional Theory Matters, 54 OKLA . L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (“the continuing allure of formalism
dominates constitutional law.”); Jack Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign
Relations Law, 70 U. COLO . L. REV. 1395 (1999); Andrew S. Gold, Formalism and State
Sovereignty in Printz v. United States: Cooperation by Consent, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
247, 247 (1998) (describing Printz as replacing functionalism with “structural formalism” in the “state
sovereignty context”) ; Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of Formalism,
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functional problems as well, of the sort the modern Court has taken quite seriously in other contexts.403
Application of the avoidance canon in the nondelegation context will usually force judges to
shape saving constructions reflecting their individual views of sound policy. Many different constructions
serving many different values may clarify a statutory mandate. For example, take our statute requiring
EPA to write “good environmental regulations.” A judge could clarify this by requiring that costs not
exceed benefits or that no individual suffer health impairment. The choice between these views (and
other possibilities) would necessarily reflect a judicial policy preference.
In other cases, parties opposing government regulation will get to choose a saving construction,
even when a saving construction supporting more vigorous government regulation is fairly available.
Regulated parties will have an incentive to challenge a statute under the nondelegation doctrine, because
they will escape regulation if a court finds the statute unconstitutional. They can argue in the alternative
for a construction weakening regulation.
Beneficiaries of government regulation, by contrast, have no incentive to raise a nondelegation claim.
Since they will benefit from regulation under a statute, they do not want a court to find it unconstitutional.
Hence, they probably will not ask a court to construe a statute to avoid a nondelegation question.
This probably explains why the American Trucking Court granted certiorari on the question of
1997 SUP. CT . REV. 199, 200 (describing the Court’s opinion in Printz as “decidedly formalistic”); Cf.
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
1089, 1094 (2000) (characterizing the Court’s commerce and dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
as casting “aside” the “categories and methods” of “formalism” and “realism”). See generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers
Cases, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21 (1998).
See e.g.. O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994) (suggesting that judicial policymaking is inappropriate and declining to fashion a federal common law rule).
403

87

whether it should construe the Clean Air Act to require EPA consideration of cost when the agency
promulgated national ambient air quality standards.404 The Supreme Court considered this interpretation
because the parties challenging the Act under the nondelegation doctrine preferred this construction. 405
A court could clarify the Act’s mandate that EPA protect public health with an adequate margin of
safety, by specifying that this meant allowing no more than 100 people to die or experience serious
injury.406 But no party asked the Court to consider this construction, because EPA, environmental
groups, and the pro-EPA states did not favor any statutory holding on nondelegation grounds.407
Under other constitutional doctrines, the nature of the constitutional problem controls the policy
direction of constructions avoiding constitutional questions. The avoidance canon tends to encourage
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The issue of whether EPA should consider cost in writing the NAAQS does not present a
strikingly appropriate issue for certiorari otherwise. The lower courts had consistently affirmed the
principle that EPA may not consider cost in setting the NAAQS, see American Trucking, 531 U.S. at
464, and the Supreme Court had denied certiorari on the same question when it first made its way to
the court of appeals. See Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc. v. EPA, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
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See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 470.

Cf. American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3rd 1027, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(suggesting various interpretations of the statute that do not require consideration of cost).
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See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 48, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Whitman,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426) (arguing that this case offers “no occasion to give Section 109 a
narrowing construction”); Brief for Respondents Massachusetts & New Jersey at 37, American
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426) (heading urges Court not to
use nondelegation doctrine as an “excuse to rewrite the statute.”); Brief for Cross-Respondent
American Lung Association at 40, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)
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that could justify imposing a narrowing construction of the Act.").
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free speech, 408 protect criminal defendants,409 and limit regulation of churches410 because of the
substantive content of the constitutional provisions underlying the constructions.
Therefore, the substantive policies that the judicial constructions implement have roots in constitutional
values, rather than judicial policy decisions lacking constitutional foundation.
This problem of constitutionally suspect and unprincipled construction has the potential to have
quite broad consequences. Since legislation almost always leaves some issues unresolved, litigants can
raise nondelegation claims about almost every statute relying upon executive branch implementation.411
To be sure, many of these claims will appear implausible to courts and will not trigger extraordinary
construction. But judges may find any one of these claims plausible and construe a statute to avoid it.
The D.C. Circuit’s holding in American Trucking suggests that this practice would prove random and
unpredictable, for that court found a nondelegation attack plausible under one of the most prescriptive
statutes this side of the Internal Revenue Code.412

See e.g. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. S. B. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961); DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575-78 (1987) (construing statute to permit
leafleting); Kloppenberg, supra note 116 (discussing avoidance in the first amendment context).
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See e.g. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1999).

See e.g. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (construing
statute to avoid NLRB jurisdiction over church-operated schools).
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See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1999) (Congress
probably cannot anticipate all applications of a general policy).
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See Chevron v. United States, 467 U.S. 837, 848 (1984) (describing the Clean Air Act as
“detailed, lengthy,” and “complex”); American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1058 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (Judge Tatel dissenting) (the Act describes “in detail” many of EPA’s powers), modified,
195 F.3d 4, majority opinion reversed in part, Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457 (2001); General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 871 F.2d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing the Act as
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A practice of construing statutes to avoid nondelegation problems, if it catches on, has the
potential to unpredictably affect a lot of public law. The avoidance canon does not now control most
statutory construction, because the constitution’s specific provisions usually only present problems in
somewhat limited areas. For example, free speech claims may arise in libel,413 but arise seldom (if at all)
in the environmental context, where the law limits pollution rather than communication. The
nondelegation doctrine, by contrast, involves a general theory of legislation, so litigants can raise
nondelegation claims about a wide variety of statutes.414
This means that frequent use of the avoidance canon in the nondelegation context could lead to
significant judicial control of important policies now set by Congress. This would represent a radical
change, especially for regulatory legislation. Currently, most administrative law cases revolve around
searches for Congressional intent and evaluations of the reasonableness of agency actions under the
Administrative Procedure Act415. They do not often involve constitutional questions. Nor do they
frequently allow judges to construe statutes based on their own policy preferences, even though these
preferences may subtly influence judicial reading of Congressional intent.
It is perhaps not surprising that the cases where the Court has most clearly recognized the need

a “detailed legislative scheme”).
413

See e.g. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

See e.g. American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457 (Clean Air Act); Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748 (1996) (Uniform Code of Military Justice); W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394 (1928) (Tariff Act of 1922).
414
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5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521.
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to limit application of the avoidance canon have arisen in the area of criminal law.416 Serious and
legitimate constitutional issues arise so frequently in that area, that the Court often confronts arguments
based on the avoidance canon. While the arguments arise frequently in this area, substantive
constitutional values usually apply and shape the direction of constructions. Furthermore, this does not
involve a radical constitutionalizing of criminal law, because constitutional issues already arise routinely in
this area of the law.417 This contrasts with regulatory cases that usually do not raise serious constitutional
issues.
Hence, recognizing that judicial application of the avoidance canon in the nondelegation context
raises serious constitutional concerns does not call its application into question in most other areas. On
the other hand, introducing frequent resort to the avoidance canon under the nondelegation doctrine
would radically change the judicial role in public law.
III. Respecting the Limits of the Avoidance Canon and the Nondelegation Doctrine
This part will address the implications of the argument that construction to avoid nondelegation
problems leads to unprincipled and constitutionally suspect judicial policymaking. It will first discuss
some of the advantages that such construction might offer, showing that they are not as strong as might
appear. It will then discuss the issue of what federal courts should do when asked to construe a statute
to avoid a nondelegation difficulty.
A. Advantages of Construction to Avoid Resolving a Nondelegation Problem
See e.g. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998); Jones, 526 at
239-40; Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000).
416

See WAYNE R. LA FAVE, CRIMINAL LA W 97-112, 124-135, 146-158, 163-198 (3d ed.
2000) (discussing various constitutional issues that arise in criminal law).
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If a statute poses a serious nondelegation problem, then a decision not to adopt a saving
construction may leave a court with no alternative but to issue a ruling on whether that statute violates the
nondelegation doctrine. The case law on the avoidance canon generally teaches that avoidance of
constitutional issues is desirable, suggesting that the avoidance of a decision on a nondelegation claim is
likewise desirable.418
The rationale for avoiding constitutional issues, however, does not apply as forcefully to a
nondelegation claim as it does to many other types of constitutional claims. Avoiding application of the
nondelegation doctrine offers fewer advantages than most decisions to avoid resolving a constitutional
issue and entails greater disadvantages.
Application of the avoidance canon in many contexts avoids a permanent bar upon democratic
control of an important substantive policy choice, the usual consequence of a ruling striking down a
statute on constitutional grounds.419 The Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo420 illustrates
how serious cutting off democratic control of policy choices can be. Buckley held that Congress may
not limit campaign expenditures, because doing so limits free speech.421 This ruling limited democratic
experimentation with campaign finance reform. Future campaign finance legislation might limit campaign
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See Kelly, supra note 31, at 836.

See Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on
Constitutional Interpretation, 66 CHI. KENT L. REV. 481, 484 (1990) (describing constitutional
decisions as “irrevocable” and “virtually impossible” to amend).
419

420

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Id. at 14-20.
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contributions, but not expenditures.422 Many scholars have argued that this ruling has seriously crippled
efforts to limit money’s influence on politics.423 Thus, a ruling of unconstitutionality reduced the range of
democratically available policies to solve a serious public problem.
A risk always exists that a court will exercise this power to eliminate democratic control
erroneously. I have chosen a particularly important decision, and one many scholars think erroneous.
But the same general problem applies to many constitutional rulings. In the area of individual rights,
where the avoidance canon applies most frequently, a constitutional ruling frequently cuts off an entire
policy option. While this is acceptable if the Court gets it right, the risk that the Court will get it wrong is
ever present.424 Largely for this reason, the avoidance canon serves an important function by preventing
premature or unnecessary truncation of democratic decision-making.
The avoidance canon, however, does not serve the function of preserving the formal opportunity
for democratic control of policy decisions when applied to save a statute from the nondelegation
doctrine. If the Court holds that a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine, Congress remains free to
effectuate the full range of policy choices otherwise available to it. Since Congress has made no policy
choice to begin with, but directed another branch of government to legislate, then a judicial finding that
the legislation is unconstitutional formally eliminates no legislative policy option. Congress may continue
to legislate on the subject, but must adopt a policy. Thus, the avoidance canon applied to a
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See e.g. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX . L. REV. 1705 (1999).
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See Kloppenberg, supra note 99, at 1053 (discussing fallibility of judges).
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nondelegation claim does not serve one of its principal functions, avoidance of a permanent ban on
specific future policy options.
A ruling that Congress has unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to an agency,
however, does have serious, albeit different, consequences. Such a ruling prohibits the agency from
acting, at least until Congress rewrites the legislation to embody a policy. Prohibiting executive branch
action unless and until Congress adopts a policy can have very serious negative consequences. If
Congress enacts legislation, it has decided that the subject matter of the legislation needs attention.
Given the enormous workload that Congress has,425 a Congressional decision that a matter requires
executive and/or judicial attention must be taken very seriously. At a minimum, a holding of
unconstitutionality implies that the government will not immediately address a pressing national problem.
More seriously, the holding of unconstitutionality may cause a failure to address a pressing
problem at all. Congress may not always be able to respond to a holding of unconstitutionality by
adopting a policy.426 A failure to adopt a policy might arise for a number of reasons. Congress may not
have the time to gather and assess relevant information, especially if a very broad and complicated
problem presents itself.427
Alternatively, Congress may have sufficient information to at least make a general policy, but a

See generally POSNER, supra note 31, at 285 (discussing increasing congressional
workload).
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See Manning, supra note 18, at 714 (referring to “the substantial inertia of the legislative

process.”).
See Mishkin, supra note 344, at 800; Sunstein, supra note 22, at 338 (lack of information
may provide a good reason for Congress to delegate authority).
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legislative majority may not favor any policy choice.428 In either case, a possibility exists that a
nondelegation ruling will cut off a needed policy decision, thwarting a democratically elected majority’s
effort to make sure that some important problem is addressed.429
But this elimination of a policy choice does not come from a formal, permanent, legal prohibition.
It comes from institutional choices and limits that may change over time. So, Congress may, at least on
occasion, respond to a nondelegation ruling by making a policy choice. This means that the
consequences of holding that a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine sometimes may prove less
permanent and serious than a ruling formally limiting the scope of political decision-making to protect
individual rights. Accordingly, a principle advantage of the avoidance canon, the avoidance of a formal
prohibition forbidding democratic pursuit of specific substantive policy options, simply does not exist in
this area.
All this does not suggest that the Courts should feel free to make the nondelegation doctrine
more stringent. I will address the subject of the appropriate scope of the nondelegation doctrine in
another article, but I must say a little about this here. Congress appropriately legislates at a fairly high
level of generality for a variety of reasons. The words in legislation must guide a large number of future

See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 338 (a “multimember body” may find “closure on any
particular course of action” difficult); Mishkin, supra note 344, at 800 (political realities may compel
Congress to bypass an issue).
428

See Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 22, at 13-14 (arguing for the appropriateness of
allowing agency discretion when the “political system” dooms direct Congressional efforts to alleviate
an important problem).
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actions, often over a long period of time.430 Legislation must be general enough so that its principles can
make sense when applied to a variety of circumstances,431 some of which nobody can foresee.432 Even
when it is desirable to legislate with great particularity, majority rule requires less than ideal particularity.
Legislation must reflect the views of a majority, and agreement between a large group of people may
often only exist at a fairly high level of generality. A judicial demand for great specificity may paralyze
democratic rule.
A nondelegation ruling does limit the availability of a democratic decision to have the executive
branch cope with a vexing and perhaps changing problem with maximum flexibility. That can prove very
serious, especially in areas where repeated detailed decisions are essential. 433
Unfortunately, a court seems especially unlikely to know when a constitutional ruling will block
or improve the democratic process in Congress.434 Predicting whether a nondelegation holding will lead
to a policy decision requires an understanding of elected officials and the political pressures they face.
Because judges have little direct involvement in either electoral politics or legislative processes, they
seem very unlikely to fully appreciate the changing political realities that govern the question of whether

See Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405, 407 (1928) (explaining that the facts
from which a tariff should be calculated may vary over time).
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Congress will respond to a constitutional ruling with a policy decision.
The point that holding a statute unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine creates a risk
of political paralysis rather than a permanent formal prohibition on policy-making, however, sharply
reframes the issue of whether avoidance of constitutional rulings under the nondelegation doctrine
through saving constructions is desirable. For the risk to the democratic process that a constitutional
ruling poses resembles the risk to the democratic process that a saving construction poses under the
nondelegation doctrine. If a construction is erroneous, Congress may not correct it, because of political
paralysis.435 Similarly, if a Court erroneously strikes down a statute under the nondelegation doctrine,
Congress may not correct it, because of political paralysis.
Indeed, a judicial construction may enhance the probability that Congress will fail to make a
needed policy choice.436 Once a Court construes a statute, a democratic policy choice requires not just
a Congressional reversal of the previous paralysis that prevented a policy choice in the original
legislation, but also summoning the political will to overcome a new status quo bearing judicial
imprimatur. While Congress sometimes overrules judicial decisions including judicial decisions
implementing various substantive canons, it usually does so, at least in part, because it has already
agreed upon a policy and sees the Court as having erroneously interfered with its policy choice.437 If
See Merrill, supra note 99, at 22-23 (because of its crowded agenda, Congress is likely not
to act on any given issue; therefore “lawmaking by federal courts” would shift policymaking power from
Congress toward the judiciary).
435
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For example, the Court interpreted the civil rights act as not applying oversees, a very
dubious interpretation based upon a clear statement rule. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
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Congress has not been able to choose a policy in the past, a saving construction probably will lessen the
chances of it choosing one in the future.438
Saving legislation that might flunk a nondelegation test will not encourage Congress to legislate
more vaguely than necessary.439 Congress sometimes legislates in the hopes of exercising as much
control as possible over the future. To the extent representatives want to have power over the country’s
future (which seems like at least one significant motivation to run for public office), they have a built in
incentive to be specific when a majority can agree to specific legislation. For specificity enhances their
control over future implementation.440
On the other hand, if Congress wants to do nothing while appearing to do something, it does not
require the Court’s endorsement of vagueness to do this. Indeed, representatives that do not want to
control the future will not care if the Court strikes down their vapid legislation. A ruling of
unconstitutionality only helps evaders of responsibility in Congress. Such a ruling allows evaders to claim

U.S. 244, 262-63 (1991) (dissenting opinion) (explaining why majority’s construction was poor).
Congress subsequently revised the statute to correct the Court’s arguably erroneous construction.
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (recognizing that Congress superseded
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.’s holding). The causes for overriding, however, are complex.
See William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE
L. J. 331 (1991). Professor Eskridge reaches the disturbing conclusion that Congress is unlikely to
overrule decisions that harm unorganized individuals or groups. See id. at 352-53.
Cf. Bressman, supra note 4, at 1420 (explaining that when broad delegation is needed to
secure passage of a statute, it is hard to get another statute enacted quickly).
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credit for trying to do something, to simultaneously avoid any blame for actual implementation (since the
legislation won’t be implemented), and to blame the Court for the failure to get anything done.441
A saving construction facilitates the partial fulfillment of the Congressional desire that an agency
solve some of the problems the legislation addresses. If this advantage suffices to justify saving
construction, however, it would justify administrative or judicial construction. Hence, it would be difficult
to reconcile a view that saving construction is appropriate because of the need to allow some action with
American Trucking’s rejection of administrative saving construction. Indeed, saving construction to
facilitate administrative action ignores, rather than avoids, the nondelegation issue.
The value of avoidance of a ruling potentially affirming unwise legislation also seems more
problematic in the nondelegation context.442 A holding that a statute conforms to the nondelegation
doctrine does not implicate the substantive content of the statute. Therefore, upholding a statute under
the nondelegation doctrine does not lend judicial support to the statutes’ substantive policies. While it’s
conceivable that the public will misperceive the Court as lending its imprimatur to upheld legislation, that
risk is slight when the Court has said little or nothing about its substantive content. Judicial endorsement
of vagueness, the problem that one might read into rulings upholding statutes under the nondelegation
doctrine, is simply too abstract a problem to influence public opinion. For that reason, it will have little
effect upon Congress. Judicial choices of saving constructions run a risk of encouraging questionable
policies, but decisions simply upholding statutes on nondelegation grounds pose little risk of lending

See Schauer, supra note 262, at 92 (noting that politicians pay no political penalty for voting
for good policies that courts subsequently find unconstitutional).
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judicial support to bad policies.
If an erroneous holding of constitutionality has few negative consequences, but an erroneous
holding of unconstitutionality has some serious consequences (albeit not the cutting off of democratic
policy choice altogether), the better approach might be to apply a different canon, the canon that
requires the Court to construe statutes to avoid holdings of unconstitutionality.443 This canon only comes
into play when the statute will fail unless saved.444 This contrasts with the avoidance canon, which
properly applies even if the Court is not sure that it will otherwise strike down the statute.445
The foregoing analysis, however, casts doubt on the virtues of any construction to avoid a
nondelegation ruling. The arguments about the lack of constitutional foundation for saving constructions
and the lack of principled guidance for their substance apply fully to application of the canon favoring
constructions to save an otherwise unconstitutional statute. The argument that construction and holdings
of unconstitutionality under the nondelegation doctrine have similar consequences for future
Congressional policy-making also applies fully to this older canon. The imminence of a holding of
unconstitutionality, however, exacerbates the concern about thwarting any action on a matter deemed
important by Congress. Thus, a slightly stronger argument exists for application of this canon, than for
the application of the avoidance canon.
See Henry Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in
BENCHMARKS 211-12 (1967). Judge Friendly argued that the availability of this narrower canon
counsels that rulings construing statutes to avoid constitutional doubts should only come into play where
the doubt is exceedingly real, a position that the Court endorsed in Almendarez-Torres.
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The decision about whether to save a statute facing a nondelegation defeat through construction,
from a functionalist perspective, requires a comparison of the threats to the democratic process posed
by a constitutional ruling to that posed by a saving construction. The foregoing discussion shows that the
sharp advantage avoidance usually offers from a functionalist democratic perspective simply does not
exist when the avoidance canon applies to a nondelegation claim.
The functionalist perspective is the traditional perspective of the avoidance canon
jurisprudence.446 The Court avoids constitutional questions in order to avoid functioning as an
impediment to democratic decision-making.447
On the other hand, the modern Court appears quite formalist. A formalist perspective might
suggest that neither a court nor an agency should ever save a statute from a nondelegation problem. The
existence of such a problem implies a failure to legislate, which implies a need for fresh legislation, not
presumptively unconstitutional construction.
B. Avoiding the Problem of Avoidance
The problematic nature of both nondelegation rulings and constructions avoiding nondelegation
rulings supports the Court’s adherence to its current views regarding the nondelegation doctrine and the
limits in the avoidance canon.448 The Court has largely heeded the critics of the avoidance canon and
strengthened the canon's strictures in recent years. Critics have emphasized the danger activist statutory
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See e.g. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998); Miller v. French,
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construction can pose to democratic control of policy, and the Court has recently emphasized the
requirement that saving construction be "reasonably available" as a result.449 Nevertheless, the case for
avoidance remains strong in a variety of areas, because a constitutional ruling has such serious countermajoritarian consequences.
This article's analysis, however, should lead to more attention to the variety of consequences
constitutional rulings entail in different constitutional realms as part of the debate about the avoidance
canon. This article shows that the consequences of a nondelegation ruling do not include formally cutting
off Congressional policy options. One can generalize that conclusion, to a degree. When constitutional
doctrines limit the procedures government can employ, rather than the substantive content of legislation,
holdings of unconstitutionality do not cut off substantive policy options for Congress. Thus, holdings
regarding the separation of powers, for example, may limit the form of government, rather than its ends.
This implies that avoidance of constitutional rulings in some procedural areas may not have the direct
formal consequence of avoiding limitations upon substantive democratic policy choice. By contrast,
rulings avoiding holdings about the substance of individual rights and the extent of the power of the
federal government, for example, may avoid cutting off Congressional control of policy.
A full assessment of the consequences differentiation of constitutional impacts should have for
application of the avoidance canon lies beyond the scope of this article. In many cases, avoidance may
have salutary consequences other than avoiding loss of democratic control of specific substantive policy
choice. For example, avoidance of separation of powers questions may limit the need for constitutional

Compare Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 238 with POSNER, supra note 31, at 285;
Mashaw, supra note 262, at 840..
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decisions without adequate textual guidance.450 For textualists or for those concerned about the
difficulty of wise functional judicial choices in the separation of powers realm, this virtue might constitute
a significant advantage.451 This differentiation of consequences will add to a finer assessment of the
value of application of the avoidance canon in various constitutional realms.
This article's concern about avoidance of nondelegation issues, however, also rests significantly
upon concerns about the lack of a constitutional basis for a saving construction, a concern which may be
unique to nondelegation cases. These concerns should, at a minimum, make judges want to avoid the
problem of avoiding nondelegation rulings.
Judicial adherence to the Court’s cases reaffirming the limits of the nondelegation doctrine and
refusing to apply the avoidance canon without first examining the relevant constitutional precedent to
ascertain whether a really serious constitutional difficulty exists may allow the Court to continue its
tradition of not ducking nondelegation challenges. Congress, of course, must continue to write at least
general policy into legislation. Otherwise, the Court will have to choose between narrowing construction
and a holding of unconstitutionality.
This article shows that the logic of American Trucking leads to the conclusion that courts
probably lack the power to save statutes facing truly serious nondelegation claims from constitutional
attack, except in the few areas where they have lawmaking power wholly independent of legislation.
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Furthermore, the functional considerations supporting avoidance in most contexts do not fully apply in
the nondelegation context.
Thus, the American Trucking Court acted properly when it reached the nondelegation issue in
the Clean Air Act, finding it constitutional, thereby continuing its general practice of not ducking
nondelegation issues.452 I have suggested that this is not problematic and few people will mistake this
holding for a ringing endorsement of the Clean Air Act’s mandate to protect public health. In so doing, it
remained true to the nondelegation doctrine. This article suggests that the Court also, perhaps
unconsciously, avoided some peculiar problems that would arise from construing statutes to avoid
nondelegation defects as well. Its decision was even wiser than the Court realized.
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Conclusion
Construing statutes to avoid nondelegation problems may create more constitutional problems
than it solves. Fortunately, substantive canons of statutory construction have not created a new home
for a revived and revamped nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, the common view that the Court has
frequently applied the avoidance canon to avoid difficult nondelegation issues turns out to be incorrect.
This article suggests that the Court has acted properly in reaching and resolving nondelegation issues
when they arise, rather than using statutory construction to avoid them. It would be ironic indeed if
canons of statutory construction inspired by the ghost of the nondelegation doctrine converted unelected
administrators or judges into legislators, thereby reading a doctrine prohibiting delegation of legislative
authority as a reason to exercise broad prospective legislative authority to rewrite our laws.
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